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Abstract
Within the last five years, the special administrative region of Hong Kong found itself embroiled
in two major anti-government protests that brought the entire city to a standstill. While both the
2014 Umbrella Movement and the 2019 AntiELAB Protests were similar in pro-democracy
rhetoric and substantive collective action, the 2019 protests devolved into a much more violent
and radical movement than that of 2014. This study investigates the factors that contributed to
the differing protest cultures of the Umbrella Movement and the AntiELAB Protests. This study
first explores the language of the Joint Declaration and Basic Law, and investigates British and
Chinese incompetence in handling Hong Kong’s handover in order to show that the city’s
transition into becoming a special administrative region fundamentally shaped its current
political vulnerabilities. This study then argues that the 2019 AnitELAB Protests were
comparatively more anarchic than any previous political movements as a result of five main
factors: the triggers of the protests, the differences in political circumstances, the differing
socioeconomic environments, the changes in protest strategies, as well as the radicalization of
media and technology usage. Through citing Hong Kong’s Basic Law, recent political events,
news reporting, socioeconomic statistics, as well as media theory, this study argues that Hong
Kong’s unstable position as a temporary liberal democracy under Chinese rule contributed to its
increasingly radical protest environment. This study concludes by asserting that only by
confronting the city’s political insecurities, promoting democracy, safeguarding citizens’
individual rights, and alleviating socioeconomic inequality, will the government be able to
prevent the next large protest that could destroy Hong Kong for good.
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Introduction
On June 12th 2019, Hong Kong’s streets were filled with over 1 million protesters
rallying against an Extradition Law and Bill that would infringe on the city’s core democratic
values and freedoms. This law would have allowed Hong Kong citizens to be handed over to the
mainland if they were charged with a crime considered rectifiable under Beijing’s jurisdiction.
The law fundamentally threatened Hong Kong citizens’ freedom of speech, democracy, and
political expressions. As a result of the panic, the Extradition Law and Bill mobilized fourteen
percent of Hong Kong’s population, leading to city-wide stand-still, and marking the region’s
largest ever peaceful mass protest. As months passed, Hong Kong’s tranquil community was
brandished as it degenerated into violent demonstrations dubbed the Anti-Extradition Law and
Bill Movement (‘AntiELAB Movement’ henceforth). Streets filled with teargas, university
campuses burned down, civilians were shot by officers, triad members ran amuck in the city, and
Hong Kong’s economy took a severe downturn. While the movement initially sought to
peacefully persuade the government to withdraw the Extradition Bill, chaos quickly spread over
the following seven months as a result of growing anti-Chinese sentiment and dissatisfaction
over Beijing’s control in Hong Kong. The AntiELAB Movement scarred Hong Kong’s image as
‘Asia’s world city’. Instead of a commercial hub known for order and peaceful civil
disobedience, Hong Kong morphed into a city of political polarization, marked by a meltdown of
law, order, and democracy.
The 2019 AntiELAB Movement, however, was not the first case of mass activism in
Hong Kong triggered by democratic backsliding. Since 2003, Hong Kong has witnessed several
large-scale protests fuelled by pro-democracy sentiments. Demonstrations in 2003 successfully
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pushed back against a national security legislation that would have prohibited “any act of
treason, secession, sedition, subversion against the Central People's Government” (Hong Kong
Special Administrative Region Basic Law). In both 2005 and 2010, mass protests calling for
universal suffrage garnered increased awareness towards the city’s political environment and
voting legislation (Gunia). However, out of all of Hong Kong’s demonstrations since the city’s
handover, the anti-government protests of 2014 stood as the most closely related to the 2019
AntiELAB Movement, both in terms of scale and political activism.
Hong Kong’s 2014 demonstrations were marked by a series of peaceful street sit-in and
protests, widely referred to as the Umbrella Movement. The protests attempted to shut down
Beijing-proposed measures aimed at changing Hong Kong’s electoral system. If approved by
LegCo, the law would only allow for pre-approved candidates chosen by the Chinese Communist
Party to run for Chief Executive. This would prevent universal suffrage from ever being fully
achieved in Hong Kong despite earlier promises made by Beijing. Similar to the 2019 AntiELAB
Protests, the Umbrella Movement had a remarkable scale of participation, with the annual July
1st march attracting over half a million protesters. Also similar to the 2019 protests, the
Umbrella Movement pushed against encroaching Chinese power on Hong Kong’s rule of law. It
came to be known globally as a highly politicized pro-democracy movement that challenged
China’s authoritarian control in the region. After three months of peaceful sit-ins and mass
demonstrations, The Umbrella Movement finally fizzled out, leaving Hong Kong with a global
legacy of a democratic nation capable of mass peaceful political activism.
While both Hong Kong’s 2014 and 2019 protests were instrumental in promoting
democratic sentiments amongst the city’s population, both held key differences in their triggers,
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lengths, and political developments. On one hand, the 2014 Umbrella Movement lasted under
three months and remained relatively peaceful throughout its duration. There were seldom
instances of violence or destruction. On the other hand, the 2019 AntiELAB Protests continued
throughout most of 2019, and became increasingly chaotic as time passed. In the latter half of
2019, Hong Kong deteriorated into disorder and stark polarization. The differences in outcomes
of these two protests, that both began with similar intentions, has brought forward questions as to
what changed in Hong Kong within five short years.
This study seeks to explain the differences between Hong Kong’s 2014 and 2019 protests
in order to shed light onto why the 2019 AntiELAB Movement uncharacteristically devolved
into mayhem. This study explores the underlying drivers of the AntiELAB Protests to understand
why it differs so substantially in size, duration, tactics, and impact compared with the Umbrella
Movement. The first chapter of this study provides a brief historical background of the politics of
Hong Kong starting with British occupancy, moving through the handover from Britain to China,
and ending with the city’s post-handover protest environment. Through exploring handover, this
study will discuss how the Joint Declaration and Basic Law’s drafting processes have influenced
Hong Kong’s wider political uncertainty and dissatisfaction to this day. This study will then
briefly explore the causes and progression of both the 2014 Umbrella Movement and the 2019
AntiELAB Protests to provide socio-political contexts for each movement. Because research for
this study began in early 2020, it will only cover events up to January 1st 2020 regarding the
effects and progression of the AntiELAB Movement. The second chapter of this study will
investigate five core reasons as to why two protests differed so greatly: 1) the triggers of the
protests, 2) the political circumstances, 3) the socioeconomic environment, 4) the usage of
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technology and media, and finally 5) the changes in protest strategies. The study will then
conclude by consolidating its main ideas, and offering possible actions that the Hong Kong
government should take to ensure that another protest will not occur and ultimately bring the city
to the ground.
By exploring the complex history, politics, and protest cultures of Hong Kong, this study
argues that the 2019 AnitELAB Protests were comparatively more anarchic than any of the city’s
previous political movements as a result of the increasing threats that Beijing has presented
towards Hong Kong. The nature of Hong Kong’s political climate and its unstable position as a
temporary liberal democracy under China has contributed to its citizens' increasing political
dissatisfaction. Through understanding the core differences between two of the largest and most
influential protests in Hong Kong’s post-handover history, this study will show that Hong Kong
citizens have resorted to acting radically in recent years as they feel they have no other option
than to physically fight for their freedoms. This study will therefore argue that the 2019
AntiELAB Protests were as violent as they were as a result of Hong Kong’s changing political
circumstances that progressively undermine the diplomatic security of the special administrative
region.
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Chapter 1: History and Background
In order to better understand the political tensions between the people of Hong Kong and
the Chinese government, it is important to first examine the commitments made by Beijing in
establishing Hong Kong as a special administrative region.
Colonization
The story of Hong Kong’s complex identity began in 1842. Under the Treaty of Nanking,
Hong Kong Island was surrendered from China to the United Kingdom marking the beginning of
the city’s complex international and colonial experience. In 1860, the Kowloon Peninsula and
Stonecutters island were further ceded to British control. Finally, in 1898, the New Territories
and Hong Kong’s outlying islands were temporarily leased from China to Britain for 99 years
until 1997. The finite nature of the New Territories lease triggered new considerations over Hong
Kong’s identity, exacerbated by Britain’s loosening grip on most of its colonies worldwide. By
the 1970s, serious negotiations began over the future status of Hong Kong, as the idea of keeping
Hong Kong Island under British control while returning the leased New Territories back to China
was both unlikely and impractical (Lilley 163). Since most of Hong Kong’s industrial complexes
were located in the New Territories, the return of the island back to China would provoke land
and natural resources scarcity that would seriously cripple the city-state. The British thus decided
that Hong Kong would benefit by remaining a cohesive entity after 1997. When the United
Nations General Assembly finally passed the resolution of removing Hong Kong and Macau as
colonies in 1972, discussions over Hong Kong’s handover process began to take on full effect.
In 1979, Hong Kong governor Murray MacLehose met with Chinese leader Deng
Xiaoping to begin discussions over Hong Kong’s sovereignty. On the British side, MacLehose
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argued for the entirety of Hong Kong, including the New Territories and outlying islands, to
remain under British administration after 1997. Deng Xiaoping, on the other hand, asserted the
necessity of Hong Kong to return to China, due to the city having made risky loans that could
only be backed by the Chinese Government. Deng argued that large-scale infrastructure projects
such as Hong Kong’s subway MTR system required Beijing’s support. Deng thus proposed an
arrangement with the British government to give Hong Kong a special status under Chinese rule
(Zhang 57-66). MacLehose’s visit to Beijing alarmed the British of the looming issue of Hong
Kong's contentious sovereignty, as well as China’s intent of resuming rulership over the region.
Britain’s faltering grip over the city pushed them to continue negotiations with China in hopes to
retain some British influence in Hong Kong’s future. The continued bickering between two
major political forces, and inability to make decisions over Hong Kong’s future foreshadowed
the fate of the city as a pawn in a China and Britain's battle for power.

Negotiations and the Two-legged Stool
In 1982, three years after MacLehose’s first visit to Beijing, the United Kingdom began
to establish an understanding with China in Beijing’s plans to reclaim Hong Kong. In a meeting
with British envoy Edward Heath, Deng outlined his plan to make Hong Kong a special
economic zone, which would allow the city to retain its free-market system despite being under
Chinese sovereignty (Zhang 54). However, in allowing Hong Kong to have these freedoms,
Deng emphasized the lack of room for compromise in his proposal, citing the unfairness of the
original Treaty of Nanking that placed Hong Kong into the hands of Britain in the first place.
Britain, who had also stood stubbornly by their beliefs, re-emphasized the validity of the original
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treaties of Nanking, asserting that China needed to respect the treaties on universal terms.
Despite the two sides disagreeing, Beijing’s strong stance ultimately triumphed, pushing the
British to begin formal negotiations over Hong Kong that would change the city’s political
landscape forever.
Issues regarding Hong Kong’s governance and democratic stability can thus be traced
back to these negotiations between Britain and China. Despite the importance of these
discussions, only Chinese and British governments were present at the negotiating table to
determine Hong Kong’s sovereign future. Governor Youde, a British councilman stationed in
Hong Kong, had declared his intention to represent the city’s population during these
discussions. However, Beijing was furious with this proposal, with Deng denouncing the idea of
the “three-legged stool” in the negotiation process. Beijing emphasized that issues over Hong
Kong’s territory did not need the input of three parties. Instead, Deng argued that Hong Kong’s
viewpoint could be handled by China asserting that the city’s experience was a part of “the
common aspirations of the Chinese People''. Thus, Deng maintained that there “should not be
three legs, only two legs” in the negotiation process (Yeung). Deng’s decision, left unchallenged
by the British, completely shut out Hong Kong in discussions regarding the city’s future. In the
same way that China refused to honor the Nanking Treaties, and in the same way that the British
exercised colonial force over the region, both nations undermined Hong Kong’s political agency
by refusing to recognise the validity of the city’s Legislative Council (‘LegCo’ in short). Thus,
the exclusion of Hong Kong in these negotiations to determine the special administrative
region’s future left the city in a vulnerable political state even before its handover.
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As negotiations continued, The British government proposed to transform Hong Kong
into a British nation with Chinese administration rather than to give the city completely over to
Chinese sovereignty. Beijing refused, claiming that the ideas of administration and sovereignty
were inseparable. The inability for both sides to come to an agreement escalated tensions until
the Chinese government finally declared an ultimatum; the British government had to give up its
position in Hong Kong or else Beijing would publicly announce its resolution of Hong Kong as
one under unilateral Chinese sovereignty (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC). As a result of
China’s threats, in 1983, the British government expressed their willingness to explore
arrangements optimizing the future of Hong Kong while accounting for China’s proposals. Most
significantly, in 1993, British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher recognized Chinese sovereignty
in Hong Kong’s future, which she highlighted in her letter to Chinese Premier Zhao Ziyang:
“… provided that an agreement can be reached between the two sides on
administrative arrangements for Hong Kong to guarantee the future prosperity and
stability of Hong Kong, (...) I would be prepared to recommend to the Parliament that
sovereignty over the entire Hong Kong would be returned to China.” ( Thatcher)
Thatcher's letter, in addition to both governments’ willingness to press forward with the issue of
Hong Kong’s sovereignty, led to a second round of meetings between the two nations from 1983
to 1984. These meetings cleared most tensions between the two nations by showing British
sincerity in discussing China’s proposal of Hong Kong’s status as a special economic zone (Wu
11-17).
Just as the atmosphere of the negotiations were beginning to look stable, members of
Hong Kong’s Legislative Council announced that they had felt blindsided by the nature of the
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long-running secrecy of the Sino-British negotiations over Hong Kong. Legislator Roger Lobo
declared that it is “essential that any proposals for the future of Hong Kong should be debated in
this [Hong Kong Legislative] Council before agreement is reached". (Scott 207-212). Despite
the Hong Kong Legislative Council’s unanimous pass of a motion to vote on future handover
proposals, the Chinese Communist Party attacked the motion furiously. China referred to Hong
Kong’s democratic ruling as “a ttempt to play the three-legged stool trick again", and refused to
acknowledge the outcome. Even though Hong Kong’s government tried to democratically
become a part of the decision making process to determine the future of their own city, China
and Britain still were the sole decision makers in laying the foundation for Hong Kong’s future.
Therefore, since the beginning of Hong Kong’s conception as a special administrative region, the
city-state was powerless over the control of its own identity and future.

The Joint Declaration
After two years of negotiations, the Sino-British Joint Declaration was finally signed on
December 19th 1984 by the British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher and Chinese Premier Zhao
Ziyang. The two governments concluded that The People’s Republic of China would reassume
control of Hong Kong from July 1st 1997 onwards. On June 12th 1985, the Joint Declaration was
registered by both governments at the United Nations. It’s purpose was to bind both sides to the
later established Basic Law in order to solidify the administration process of a post-handover
Hong Kong. The Joint Declaration thus aimed to provide clarity that the emerging Hong Kong
would be recognizably the same place before and after 1997 (Buckley 105).
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A key problem with the Joint Declaration is that issues of importance were avoided in the
declaration’s drafting process, which would later cause complications for Hong Kong citizens
and their identity. Firstly, the sensitive area of national identity was left unaddressed in the Joint
Declaration. As a part of preparations for the handover, the issue of whether Hong Kong citizens
would be considered British, Chinese, or Hong Kong nationals proved uncertain. This issue of
identity was only later solved through an exchange of memorandum devices between the British
and the Chinese. This memorandum, which was deliberately excluded from the original Joint
Declaration, stated that:
“Under the Nationality Law of the People's Republic of China, all Hong Kong Chinese
compatriots, whether they are holders of the 'British Dependent Territories Citizens'
Passport' or not, are Chinese nationals.”
This distinction meant that over 40% of the population who possessed documents as British
Dependent Territories’ citizens would no longer have the right of permanent residency in Britain
after 1997 (Buckley 117). The experience of the Hong Kong identity has thus been one of chaos
and schizophrenia. Hong Kong citizens had already been stripped of their Chinese citizenship
during the British occupation. The handover forced citizens to switch their national alliances yet
again, abruptly denying many who had only experienced lives under a British colony of their
commonwealth identities. China’s eradication of Hong Kong citizens' nationalities, and
explicitly stating that those who didn’t have British citizenships were then after Chinese
nationals, infringes on the legitimacy of the Hong Kong citizens’ unique experience since the
handover.
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In addition to the issues of national identity, the vague and false promises made in the
Joint Declaration put Hong Kong in a vulnerable position in terms of British and Chinese
accountability. Thatcher had assured Hong Kong citizens that the United Kingdom would take
issue with any breaches of the Sino-British Joint Declaration, guaranteeing Hong Kong’s
Legislative Council that “Britain has the right to raise any breaches with China after 1997. We
would not hesitate to do so” (Hing 12). Such promises at the time made Hong Kong citizens feel
safer during their transition back to China. However, this statement would not hold the test of
time, as Britain continued to be politically distant as years progressed. Additionally, China stated
in the Joint Declaration that it would allow Hong Kong to “remain basically unchanged for 50
years” ( Hing 13). Hong Kong citizens believed that this clause implied that the city would retain
a high degree of autonomy as a special administrative region, and that China would honor the
city’s independent legal and judicial system for 50 years (Cheung). These clauses would go on to
live deeply in the hearts of Hong Kong citizens, who at the time were confident that the
democratic values that were ingrained into Hong Kong’s society would continue to live on.
However, the vague nature of these clauses would eventually create space for growing Chinese
infringement pushing for an open interpretation of the Joint Declaration that would ultimately
allow Beijing’s control to enter Hong Kong’s politics.
Finally, a vague clause in the Joint Declaration regarding the election of the city’s Chief
Executive would ultimately contribute to Hong Kong’s pro-democracy protesting culture. As a
result of the negotiations between 1982 and 1984 over the future of Hong Kong, the Chinese
leadership seemed to promise the Hong Kong community a system of self-governance. The
Hong Kong government pledged its Green Paper of July 1984 that:
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“to develop progressively a system of government the authority for which is firmly rooted
in Hong Kong, which is able to represent authoritatively the people of Hong Kong and
which is more directly accountable to the people of Hong Kong.” (Green Paper).
This decision satisfied many Hong Kong advocates of democracy at the time, as they saw the
special administrative region as a system that would give democratic power to the people.
However, this clause in the Joint Declaration lacks concrete descriptions as to what kind of
electoral system leadership would be put in place. The vague nature of the Green Paper meant
that Chinese influence in Hong Kong had the potential of being substantial rather than symbolic.
The Joint Declaration’s uncertainties regarding Chief Executive elections would later exacerbate
the Basic Law’s vague coverage of universal suffrage (J. Cheng 443-444). While the Joint
Declaration provided a baseline affirmation for liberal policies in Hong Kong society, its larger
issues of vague democratic promises would ultimately expose the flaws of the special
administrative region’s political foundations.
The Basic Law
Shortly after the Sino-British Joint Declaration was signed in 1984, the National People’s
Congress of China set up the Basic Law Drafting Committee (BLDC). The BLDC was
responsible for creating Hong Kong’s constitution for the 50 years following the 1997 handover.
During the Basic Law’s drafting process, Hong Kong people’s involvement was greatly limited.
China took control of approving the BLDC membership list, which consisted of only 23 Hong
Kong citizens in comparison with the 36 members from China. The inequality in
decision-making power was further aggravated by the chair of the BLDC being a Chinese
diplomat. In order to pretend that they were keeping Hong Kong’s perspective in consideration,
17

the BLDC sought collective opinions from Hong Kong citizens through the Basic Law
Consultative Committee (BLCC), a group made up of Hong Kong community leaders. In reality,
the BLCC was only consulted twice. This rendered the public consultations with the BLCC
nothing more than a publicity stunt, meaning Hong Kong people’s voices were barely accounted
for in the construction of their own constitution.
As the drafting of the Basic Law continued, Chinese officials began hinting that they
would prefer to see minimal change to Hong Kong’s existing constitutional system. This was
backed by their belief that the strong state presence formed the foundation of Hong Kong’s
stability and prosperity. By early 1988, it had become clear that the majority of the Basic Law
Drafting Committee favoured an executive led government with the power concentrated around
the Chief Executive. This in itself was set up to doom Hong Kong in its democratic future. Only
24 out of 56 seats in the Legislative Council were set up to be electable seats, with the remaining
32 to be appointed. Additionally, a majority of the constitutional power was set to be given to the
Chief Executive. Hong Kong thus developed a political system that looked much more like a
centralist autocratic regime than a functional democracy (J. Cheng 445). Voting power and
decision making regarding Hong Kong’s law was ultimately removed from the city’s inhabitants.
Therefore, the Chinese Communist Party was a major influence in establishing political
instability in Hong Kong through manipulating the city’s Basic Law.
Approval of the Basic Law was finally completed in April 1990. When the law was
published, it became evident that the language used in the legislation created a vague foundation
that would eventually delegitimize the city’s democratic identity. The Basic Law’s lack of clarity
in describing the election of the Chief Executive was a core contributor to Hong Kong’s
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democratic backsliding in both 2014 and 2019. For example, the Basic Law’s outline for the
choice of Hong Kong’s Chief Executive states that:
The method for selecting the Chief Executive shall be specified in the light of the actual
situation in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region and in accordance with the
principle of gradual and orderly progress. The ultimate aim is the selection of the Chief
Executive by universal suffrage upon nomination by a broadly representative nominating
committee in accordance with democratic procedures.
This clause highlights the major flaw in the Basic Law. It specifically states that the matter
should be decided at a later date, leaving excessive room for misinterpretation and undermining.
Additionally, using words such as “the ultimate aim” to describe the achievement of universal
suffrage without providing a working timeline or constructive way to achieve that goal leaves the
issue of voting to become increasingly uncertain over time. The core issue of both the Joint
Declaration and Basic Law therefore lies in the fact the British and the Chinese left some of the
most critical issues regarding Hong Kong’s future to be unresolved. This ultimately allowed the
ambiguities of the constitution to spiral out of control as time unfolded, and created a prime
environment for political volatility in the twenty-first century.
Ambiguities and Unresolved Issues
As a result of the hasty implementation of the Joint Declaration and Basic Law by the
British and Chinese governments, Hong Kong’s core political structure was flawed since its
inception. This study argues that the unilateral process of establishing Hong Kong’s constitution,
as well as the vague content of the legislations themselves, have gone on to influence the causes,
processes, and outcomes of both the 2014 Umbrella Movement and 2019 AntiELAB Protests.
19

The ambiguities and unresolved issues of the Basic Law and Joint Declaration have thus
exacerbated political uncertainty in Hong Kong even decades after the handover.
Firstly, the two-legged stool approach to policy making resulted in the implementation of
weak policies that acted as landmines in Hong Kong’s political system 20 years later. As
mentioned earlier, the British and Chinese governments were the sole decision makers in the
crafting of the city’s Joint Declaration and Basic Law. China explicitly expunged Hong Kong
citizens’ opinion from the drafting process using the two legged-stool argument. Such biased
decision-making inflamed clauses in the Basic Law such as “The Hong Kong people will be
under the authority of the Central People’s Government of China”. This language ultimately
provided constitutional backing for infringing LegCo’s power in their ability to protect the rights
of Hong Kong citizens. Therefore the law-making that established Hong Kong as a special
administrative region fundamentally undermined the legitimacy and durability of the city state’s
unique political status. This ultimately led to the democratic backsliding and political unrest
experienced in both 2014 and 2019.
Secondly, the rushed nature of drafting the Joint Declaration and Basic Law resulted in a
severely unorganized and insufficient execution of both documents. The British and Chinese
governments lacked the time to solve the deep and complex issues that needed to be addressed in
Hong Kong’s transition from a British colony to a special administrative region under Beijing's
control. The fifteen years spanning the Joint Declaration discussion period were largely
dominated by debates over Hong Kong’s future, rather than the more important aspects on how
those changes would be implemented and at what pace. Pressing issues such as potential
remedies addressing the long-term deficiencies of both documents were barely taken into
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consideration. With the handover date of 1997 looming in front of them, the Chinese and British
governments were forced to create laws that were vague and provisional. This would result in the
laws’ flexible interpretations by the Hong Kong government in the future, ultimately leading to
the implementation of contentious bills such as the 2014 Consultation Document on the Methods
for Selecting the Chief Executive and the 2019 Extradition Bill. The Chinese and British
unwillingness to work through the complexities of a handover clause, as well as their reluctance
to examine the intricate political circumstances that Hong Kong would potentially have to
experience, were principal reasons for Hong Kong’s continued civil unrest. Government
incompetence and rushed decision-making are therefore two of the unresolved legacies that has
become a root cause for political fragility in Hong Kong.
Thirdly, the joint declaration lacks follow-up signposts in most of its agreements.
International and domestic politics are subject to insurmountable changes, especially as
economies modernize and global landscapes adjust. With Hong Kong, China, and The United
Kingdom continuously developing, all of these nations' relationships with each other and the rest
of the world were bound to change. Changes in the political needs for citizens of a multinational
city-state such as Hong Kong in the fifty year period between 1997 and 2047 should have been
anticipated by British and Chinese policymakers. Additionally, international shocks such as
political uprisings, international diseases, and other disruptive conflicts should have been
foreseen in the Basic Law. Unlike most government policies which have adaptations made to it
as modernization takes place, Hong Kong’s Joint Declaration and Basic Law did not include any
capacity for signposting or adjustments. This is particularly important as the relationships
between Britain, China and Hong Kong should have been predicted to change frequently and
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drastically. Therefore, the Joint Declaration and Basic Law only reflect the realities of 1980s
politics, which even by the time of the handover in 1997 was outdated. Hong Kong’s founding
legislations are thus unreliable documents for Hong Kong citizens to rely on in the long-term.
Fourthly, the Joint Declaration lacks the language to describe consequences if either the
United Kingdom or China doesn’t abide by its commitments and goals. There is thus no way for
the Chinese and British governments to be kept accountable. Clauses such as how Hong Kong
which “will remain basically unchanged for 50 years”, or that Hong Kong’s politics will be“a
system of government the authority for which is firmly rooted in Hong Kong” means nothing if
they cannot be enforced, particularly if the enforcing parties have no real incentive to see such
promises go through. Great Britain’s increasing distance from Hong Kong’s political landscape
fails to keep the colonizing nation responsible for the policies it helped implement. There is no
legislation in place to guarantee Britain’s pledges to Hong Kong as the city transferred back to
China. Additionally, China’s slow encroachment on Hong Kong’s political and economic
landscape has spread fears regarding Beijing’s lack of commitment to its promises over Hong
Kong’s democracy and autonomy. Under the Joint Declaration, China is supposed to allow Hong
Kong to exist in its unique way of life until 2047. However there is a lack of clear language to
prevent Beijing from intervening in the special administrative region leading up to that date.
Therefore, even though the Joint Declaration and Basic Law were signed and guaranteed by both
Britain and China, there are no real incentives for either nations to comply with their promises or
ensure Hong Kong’s political sanctity.
Finally, one of the biggest unresolved issues regarding the Joint Declaration and Basic
Law is that despite Hong Kong’s designated limited time as a special administrative region, there
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is no written roadmap of how it would exist beyond 2047. While Britain and China had a vague
understanding that Hong Kong would be handed completely back to China in 2047, in 1997, this
seemed far away. As a result, Chinese and British officials failed to make a long-term plan in the
Basic Law about Hong Kong’s transition back to China. They failed to consider that Hong
Kong’s identity as a special administrative region would only heighten, with an entire generation
growing up under a liberal democracy. Without considering a roadmap for transition, Hong
Kong’s long-term political landscape was bound to be fragile, with a social environment that was
doomed to eventually burst. The issue of a temporary political climate that is set to
fundamentally shift by predetermined date puts into danger generations of Hong Kong citizens
who are accustomed to a certain democratic way of life. With the fear that those rights will
disappear in the blink of an eye and no reassurance of what comes next, Hong Kong’s society is
left with a constant state of social and political unease. As these emotions burst uncontrollably
with the right trigger pulled, it creates chaos in its wake as demonstrated by the 2014 and 2019
protests. China and Britain’s incompetency in creating a long-run plan through the Joint
Declaration and Basic Law thus highlights the fundamental issue of the finite political regime of
‘one-country two systems’.

From 1997 to 2014
The flaws of the Joint Declaration and Basic Law gradually became apparent following
Hong Kong’s handover, leading up to the 2014 Umbrella Movement and 2019 AntiELAB
Protests. The large-scale demonstrations in 2014 and 2019 were no accidents. These movements
can be understood as explosions of built-up tension and discontent leading up to Hong Kong’s
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political unravelling. As a result of Beijing’s increasing attempts to control Hong Kong, Britain’s
inability to enforce democratic legal terms, and the incapacity of the Hong Kong government to
adjust accordingly, problems began to emerge in the special administrative region.
In 2001, Hong Kong’s Chief Secretary Anson Chan, one of the main figures in the Hong
Kong government to oppose Chinese interference in the territory's affairs, was forced to resign
under pressure from Beijing. He was replaced by Donald Tsang, a prominent pro-Beijing figure
(“Hong Kong Profile - Timeline”). This signalled red flags regarding the sanctity of Hong
Kong’s status as a region supposedly independent of Beijing’s control. In 2003, Hong Kong
released proposals for Article 23 in the Basic Law, which stated that “any act of treason,
secession, sedition, subversion against the Central People's Government" would be prohibited
(Hong Kong Special Administrative Region). The proposal increased anxiety over Hong Kong’s
lawful independence just six years after its handover. While the proposal was later shelved
indefinitely as a result of city-wide marches, the government made it clear to citizens that Article
23 was not completely disposed of, furthering concerns of democratic backsliding in the region.
Additionally, in 2004, Beijing passed a law that stated Hong Kong’s Legislative Council
had to seek approval from the Chinese Central Government to enlist any changes to Hong
Kong’s laws. This gave Beijing the right to veto any moves that Hong Kong made towards
increased democracy (“Hong Kong Profile - Timeline”). While Britain accused China of
interfering with Hong Kong’s constitutional reform process and self-governance guarantees, the
British failed to enforce any rules that would change Beijing’s decision. In 2007, Beijing
announced that they would allow the people of Hong Kong to directly elect their own leadership
in 2017, as well as their own legislators in 2020. However, pro-democracy activists expressed
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their disappointment in the protracted timeline of achieving universal suffrage and the lack of
accountability on Beijing’s side. This announcement would later trigger the 2014 Umbrella
Movement. Furthermore, in 2009, Hong Kong authorities proposed a political reform to expand
its Legislative Council body, arguing it would ensure greater democracy in the region.
Pro-democracy activists criticized this move as it did not make any adjustments to increase the
collective power of individual Hong Kong citizens (“Hong Kong Profile - Timeline”). Rather,
this ruling was seen as an extension of pro-Beijing members’ powers within the Legislative
Council.
This study argues that the contents of the Joint Declaration and Basic Law set up Hong
Kong for a state of political dissatisfaction and unrest. Since its handover in 1997, Hong Kong
citizens have become increasingly frustrated with the weak foundations of their city. They
continue to find themselves vulnerable and unable to negotiate their way into securing basic
democratic rights or protections under their rule of law. The British and the Chinese
governments’ hasty decision making before the handover ultimately left some of the most critical
issues unresolved. Thus, the flaws in Hong Kong’s early policymaking aggregated and finally
became alarmingly apparent during both the 2014 and 2019 protests. With a broken system, an
inability to hold those in power accountable, Hong Kong citizens found the only way they could
fight for their futures was to take to the streets and protest for their freedom.
2014 Umbrella Movement
The Umbrella Movement was a series of pro-democracy demonstrations that emerged in
Hong Kong in mid-2014. Its name was inspired by activists’ use of umbrellas as a tool for
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peaceful resistance against the Hong Kong Police Force's use of pepper spray to disperse the
crowds during the 79-day occupation of the city.
Demands of the Protesters
The movement began as a reactionary protest against a contentious announcement made
by the Hong Kong’s National People's Congress Standing Committee (NPCSC). On August 31st
2014, The NPCSC determined that while Hong Kong citizens could vote for their own Chief
Executive in 2017 as promised, they could only do so on the condition that the candidates would
be nominated by the Hong Kong government. Front runners had to thus first be approved by a
nominating committee that was disproportionately made up of pro-Beijing members.
Pro-democracy activists in Hong Kong criticized this decision as a betrayal of the “one person,
one vote” promise made by Beijing during the handover. The NPCSC ruling was widely seen as
a restrictive policy tantamount to the Chinese Communist Party’s pre-screening of Chief
Executive candidates in the supposedly democratic Hong Kong (Sales). As a result, protesters
took to the streets demanding the right to vote for their own Chief Executive through full
universal suffrage. Protesters demanded full accountability on Beijing’s 2007 promise that Hong
Kong citizens would be allowed to directly elect their own leadership by 2017. Therefore, the
push for Hong Kong citizens’ right to a “high degree of autonomy” and universal suffrage
formed the motivational basis for the 2014 Umbrella Movement.
How the Protests Unfolded
On September 22nd, isolated street protests began to mobilise in Hong Kong’s financial
district. Over 13,000 students and participants took to the streets, protesting the government’s
August 31st decision under the peaceful movement labeled ‘Occupy Central with Love and
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Peace’. Adorning themselves in yellow ribbons and black T-shirts, students from more than
twenty universities gathered in front of the Chinese University of Hong Kong to protest against
the NPCSC rejection of universal suffrage (Connors).
On September 28th, events began escalating. As a reaction to the police’s use of force
against peaceful protesters, thousands of students and citizens surrounded the Central
Government Complex. As the day progressed, these crowds began to spread into major traffic
intersections in Hong Kong’s city-center, bringing the city to standstill. Protesters became
increasingly aggravated as police attempted to block roads and bridges leading into the Central
Government Complex. As tensions rose, police tried to contain the demonstrators by attacking
crowds with tear gas. This attracted even more supporters to the streets, many of whom carried
umbrellas to deflect the tear gas attacks. As support for the movement grew, Central’s roads
began overflowing. Soon after, instead of occupying just Central, protesters began occupying the
streets of Causeway Bay and Mongkok, transforming the movement to a larger call for political
action under the term ‘Umbrella Movement’ (Chan 576).
Despite heightened calls for the NPCSC to withdraw its August decision, the Hong Kong
government responded to the protests with a firm stance. In early October, the NPCSC publicly
argued that their proposed electoral process complied with Hong Kong’s Basic Law, and thus
civic nomination was not on the table. They cited Article 45 of the Basic Law which stated that
the ultimate aim was for Hong Kong to achieve“universal suffrage upon nomination by a
broadly representative nominating committee” (Hong Kong Special Administrative Region).
The Hong Kong government argued that this meant pre-approved election candidates were
constitutional, and that the form of universal suffrage that Hong Kong citizens were protesting
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for contradicts the Basic Law. Therefore, the debate between the government and Hong Kong’s
protesting population tied back to the central flaw of Hong Kong’s constitution. The vague
nature of the Basic Law ultimately left room for politically motivated interpretations of the
legislation, which resulted in the infringement of Hong Kong citizens’ democratic values.
As the Umbrella Movement entered its second month of protests, the disruption of main
roads had caused considerable inconvenience to the public, leading to an increased sense of
dissatisfaction amongst the wider population. The government finally decided to meet with
students on October 21st. During the meeting, the students made clear their new demands: 1) for
the government to withdraw the August decision, 2) to endorse civic nomination for universal
suffrage and free civic elections, 3) the abolition of functional constituencies, and finally 4) a
clear timeline to achieve these demands (Chan 578). The Hong Kong government responded by
offering to submit a report to Beijing’s central government expressing Hong Kong’s public
sentiment, and work towards constitutional reform after 2017 (Chan). However, Beijing never
publicly responded to any of the protesters’ demands. These empty actions by the Hong Kong
politicians were thus rejected by the public as being non-committing and vague, leading to
students and activists to continue occupying major areas throughout Hong Kong.
After two and a half months of the city-wide occupation, growing fatigue amongst
protesters began to grow. It became difficult to sustain the Umbrella Movement due to the public
inconvenience caused by blocking the city’s main roads. The movement began to lose public
support. By early December, a little under three months after the Occupy Central Movement
began, major roads reverted back to bustling highways and students returned to their university
campuses. Without much change enacted in the electoral or democratic process of Hong Kong,
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protesters stopped taking to the streets and gave up on their movement. Without an economic
motive or political threat, Beijing had little incentive to grant Hong Kong residence universal
suffrage. The government simply had to wait until everything settled down (Connors). By the
morning of December 11th, only sixteen tents were left sitting idly in Hong Kong’s central
financial district. That afternoon, within 30 minutes of the police arriving, the last tent was pulled
down, permanently halting the Umbrella Movement once and for all. The public’s heavy
activism against the government ultimately subsided, with no drastic political or democratic
goals achieved.
Outcomes of the Protests
The 2014 Umbrella Movement marked a fundamental shift in Hong Kong citizens’
attitudes towards democracy. While the Hong Kong government proposed changes that would
allow residents to vote directly for their Chief Executive, the fact that the candidates had to be
chosen by a CCP-majority nominating committee was seen as a major infringement on citizens’
democratic rights (Buckley). The movement had been an awakening for many Hong Kong
citizens. Many young people who weren't interested in politics prior to the Umbrella Movement
became more motivated to engage in activism and make their voices heard. In the end, the
subservience and passiveness that protesters were so proud of during the Umbrella Movement
led them nowhere.
A year after the protests in April 2015, the Hong Kong government formally announced
its proposal for a new voting system, ignoring the Umbrella Movement’s calls for a more
democratic electoral process. Demands for a direct election of Hong Kong's leader from 2014
were formally rejected and it was announced that a committee would choose the Chief Executive
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candidates. The failed outcome of the 2014 Umbrella Movement would thus linger in
pro-democracy activists' hearts for the years to come, only to reignite in a much different light
during the 2019AntiELAB Protests.

2019 Anti-Extradition Law and Bill Protests
While the 2014 protests did not help Hong Kong citizens achieve universal suffrage, the
Umbrella Movement has had lasting rippling effects; one of which is the endurance and resolve
that has fueled the 2019 AntiELAB Movement.
Demands of the Protesters
The 2019 Anti Extradition Law and Bill Movement was spurred by the Hong Kong
government’s February 12th announcement of its plan to amend the Fugitive Offenders
Ordinance. This amendment would allow the Hong Kong government to surrender convicted
criminals to countries that the city did not have bilateral extradition agreements with. Amongst
these nations were China, Taiwan, and Macau. While the Hong Kong government argued this
law to be a reaction against the murder of Hong Kong citizen by her boyfriend during their 2018
vacation in Taiwan (F. Lee 2), many Hong Kong citizens saw the bill as an infringement on their
democratic rights and a threat to their personal safeties. In particular the law proved problematic
as Hong Kong citizens would be allowed to be extradited to mainland China where the legal
systems are much more ambiguous and exploitative compared to Hong Kong. The Extradition
Bill thus provoked strong public concerns towards the Chinese and Hong Kong governments’
political motivations.
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As a response to the Fugitive Offenders Ordinance amendment, protesters demanded that
Chief Executive Carrie Lam fully withdraw the Extradition Bill from the public. Initially, Lam
refused to make accommodations over the bill. As protests escalated, on June 15th, Lam was
forced to announce the suspension of the Extradition Bill. However, this was not a full
withdrawal. As a response, protesters issued five ultimatums, pushing for “five demands and not
one less”. These five demands were: 1) the complete withdrawal of the Extradition Bill from the
legislation, 2) a retraction of the "riot" characterisation of the protests, 3) the release and
exoneration of arrested protesters, 4) an establishment of an independent commission of inquiry
into police conduct and use of force during the protests, and finally 5) the resignation of Carrie
Lam and the implementation of universal suffrage (Hsu). These five demands would continue to
inform the basis for the AntiELAB Movement throughout the rest of 2019.
How the Protests Unfolded
The exact start date of the AntiELAB Movement is not entirely clear. However, from the
day of the Extradition Law’s announcement in February, pro-democracy activists had been
steadily on the rise. On March 31st, the Civil Human Rights Front (CHRF), comprising dozens
of Hong Kong’s pro-democracy groups, called for the first protest against the Extradition Bill.
Thousands of activists marched to the government headquarters in Admiralty calling for the
amendment to be retracted. On April 28th, a second protest was called by the CHRF, attracting
more than 100,000 citizens to march outside LegCo. Despite these persistent demonstrations, the
Hong Kong government continued with their plans to execute the Extradition Bill.
On June 9th, three days before the second reading of the bill, the AntiELAB Movement
came into full force. Amid heavy police presence, one million citizens attended a peaceful march
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protesting the Extradition Bill, making the June 9th’s demonstration the largest ever mass-protest
in Hong Kong’s history. On June 12th, the day of the intended second reading, tens of thousands
of citizens continued to surround the Hong Kong LegCo building, preventing LegCo members
from entering. Activists on the streets felt as if their rights as citizens were being taken away
from them, with many expressing their concerns of the lack of transparency regarding the
Extradition Bill’s execution. The infringement on Hong Kong citizens’ rights again, only five
years after the Umbrella Movement, left the people of Hong Kong desperate to save the
democratic future of their city.
On June 13th, one day after the originally scheduled second Extradition Bill court
meeting, protesters successfully obstructed LegCo members from resuming the Extradition Bill
reading again. As a response, Carrie Lam called on the Hong Kong police to disperse the
protesters. Nevertheless, demonstrations continued in the following three days to prevent court
proceedings. However, unlike the generally peaceful 2014 protest, excessive violent methods
were enacted by the Hong Kong Police Force against protesters in their attempts to curb
anti-government sentiments. Police indiscriminately fired tear gas into crowds, shot rubber bullet
rounds at illegal close ranges, and assaulted members of both the international and domestic
press. Additionally, Police Commissioner Stephen Lo declared these clashes “riots”. Under the
riot classification, the police were permitted to deploy force against the citizens. Such outlandish
actions by the police generated tensions between protesters and the government that would
continue to fuel Hong Kong’s divisive political atmosphere. Following continued police-protest
clashes, protesters began calling for an independent inquiry into police brutality and pleaded for
the government to remove the “riot” characterization. Despite a pro-establishment majority on
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the LegCo, and the government’s previous confidence about its ability to push the amendment
past public opposition, Hong Kong’s Chief Executive Carrie Lam finally announced the
suspension of the Extradition Bill on June 15th. However, since the law was not fully withdrawn,
Hong Kong activists and protesters remained unsatisfied with this suspended state. The next day
on June 16th, a reported two million citizens took to the streets (F. Lee 3) to demand “five
demands and not one less”.
By July, anti-protest groups began to retaliate against the AntiELAB Movement.
Pro-Beijing citizens would wear white clothing and gather on the same streets, staging their own
protests in support of the Chinese and Hong Kong governments. Many of these pro-Beijing
groups would even run into AntiELAB protesters and actively get into physical fights with them.
On July 21st, dozens of masked men stormed the train station in Yuen Long to attack commuting
protesters. These masked figures were found to be members of local triads, and speculated to be
hired by pro-Beijing groups for retaliation (Giles).
As months passed, the originally policy-oriented protest devolved into a summer of
uprising and discontent in the special administrative region. As the more centrist protesters
re-oriented themselves back to their daily routines, populists and extremists were left to dominate
the AntiELAB Protests. Black-clad protesters took to the streets, defaced public properties, set
fires to trains, cut up traffic wires, dug up bricks from the sidewalk, and destroyed businesses
linked to pro-Beijing figures. This extremist devolvement of the protests generated growing
public resentment towards the movement. Many Hong Kong citizens felt increasingly distant
from the AntiELAB Movement as businesses faltered and citizens were unable to return to work.
On October 23rd, Carrie Lam finally announced a complete withdrawal of the Extradition Bill

33

from the legislative process. However, it was too late. Fear and fury had washed over the
protesting population so much so that any government attempts to appease the population did not
work. Hong Kong citizens’ unwillingness to back down and their stamina to continue protesting
proved just how desperate the population was to secure democratic and political safety for the
city’s future.
Outcomes of the Protests
The continued escalation of violence between AntiELAB protesters, pro-Beijing groups,
and riot police led Hong Kong’s economy to plummet with many small businesses struggling to
survive. Political polarization was steadily on the rise, with feelings of resentment left to fester in
niches of the city. Despite the government attempting to take action through withdrawing the Bill
and police control, there were still no signs of when and how the protests would end (F. Lee 3).
The protests continued to wreak havoc in the city throughout the remainder of 2019. As January
1st 2020 rolled around, protests continued to dominate the streets. Hong Kong police arrested
around 400 people after a pro-democracy New Year’s Day march with tens of thousands of
participants spiraled into chaos. January 1st marked 7,000 total arrests since June 2019, with no
way of knowing how or when the movement would end.
The AntiELAB Protests have raised a series of questions regarding Hong Kong’s future
of democracy and its status as a special administrative region. The rise of radicalization,
collective action, and innovative strategies in the 2019 protests were starkly different to the
previous 2014 Umbrella Movement. While the 2014 movement could be seen as a reaction
against democratic backsliding, the AntiELAB Protests can be understood as an explosion of
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built up frustration towards the Hong Kong government’s inability to maintain a strong and fair
rule of law to protect its citizens’ rights.
The next part of this study will investigate the reasons as to why the 2014 and 2019
protests are inherently different. In particular, this study will explore five aspects of these protest
movements: the trigger of the protests (which was briefly discussed in the two previous
sections), the political circumstances of both protests, the socioeconomic environments, the
influence of technology and media, and the types of protest methods used. Through these five
lenses, this study will show how continued government failure in Hong Kong will only lead to
further social uprisings unless democratic accountability can be finally reached. This study thus
argues that the Hong Kong government must address the core underlying issues propelling the
protests, in order to return the city to its former prosperous and peaceful environment.
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Chapter 2: How the Protests Differed
While Hong Kong’s political history and foundations were instrumental in contributing to
the city's vulnerabilities, it is also important to understand the circumstantial factors that affected
the 2014 and 2019 protests’ differing developments. Unlike the 2014 protests, the early stage
Anti-ELAB protests drew many more participants than any pro-democracy movement in the
past. Demonstrations also turned militant towards the end, filling Hong Kong’s streets with fire
and teargas. The escalation of radical activism, which led to increasingly violent protests in the
final months of 2019, is an extraordinarily unique occurrence in Hong Kong’s post-handover
history.
This chapter will explore the core reasons as to why the 2019 AntiELAB Protests
progressed much more tumultuously than the 2014 Umbrella Movement. This study looks at five
key aspects to compare the 2014 and 2019 movements: 1) triggers of the protests, 2) the political
circumstances of the protests, 3) the socioeconomic environment in which the protests happened
4) the technology and media landscapes of the protests, and 5) the differences in protest
strategies. This study thus argues that the 2019 AntiELAB Movement was much more disorderly
compared to the 2014 Umbrella Movement as a result of the faltering hope that citizens continue
to have towards the future of democracy and freedom in the special administrative region.

Triggers of the Protests
The triggers of both the 2014 and 2019 protests can be understood as a reaction against
the flaws inherent in Hong Kong’s legislation and law drafting process. On one hand, the 2014
Umbrella Movement was a result of the Basic Law’s failure to specify details on achieving
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universal suffrage. On the other hand, the 2019 AntiELAB Movement was a frustrated outburst
against the government’s lack of political protections for Hong Kong people despite their unique
status as citizens of a special administrative region. The 2019 Extradition Bill therefore triggered
a much more violent uprising throughout the city because citizens recognized just how much of a
threat the law could pose on their long-term political safeties.
Unlike the 2019 protests, the 2014 Umbrella Movement lacked the same momentum and
vigor that would have allowed the demonstrations to endure in the long-run. This can be
attributed to the initial trigger of the 2014 movement being a retraction of a policy that was never
fully enacted in the first place. Because universal suffrage had never actually been experienced
in Hong Kong, many citizens didn’t feel like the ruling posed an immediate threat to their
livelihoods. The governments’ screening of Chief Executive candidates didn’t fundamentally
change Hong Kong’s status quo. Thus, protesters’ anger was instead rooted in the idea of broken
political promises and the lack of government accountability. While citizens were still enraged at
Beijing’s failure to follow through with their promise of democratic reform, the overall changes
to the citizens’ daily lives were not tangible enough to cause mass panic. This was unlike the
2019 AntiELAB Movement in which citizens felt their immediate public safety was being
threatened by an existing policy being amended. Because citizens didn’t feel like their
livelihoods were being immediately threatened in 2014, the Umbrella Movement didn’t
deteriorate as rapidly as it did in 2019. As a result of a lack of urgency and faltering strength to
push the movement forward, citizens simply stopped occupying the streets and returned to their
regular lives after three short months of protesting. Thus, the lack of a perceived threat in 2014
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contributed to the Umbrella Movement’s early collapse and inability to push for political
concessions.
Another reason why the 2014 Umbrella Movement was less sustained and less violent
than in 2019 was because the original laws and announcements that triggered the AntiELAB
Movement were disappointingly vague. Firstly, the outline for achieving universal suffrage in the
Basic Law was unclear, and left many issues unresolved. This was a result of the hasty drafting
process enacted by the British and Chinese governments. There are no tangible written or
structural systems that states the Hong Kong government must establish full universal suffrage
by a certain date. The Basic Law only highlights that “the ultimate aim is the selection of the
Chief Executive by universal suffrage”, leaving the remaining questions of ‘when’ and ‘how’ to
be unresolved (Hing 19). Beijing was thus not obliged to hold themselves accountable to their
verbal promise of allowing full universal suffrage in Hong Kong by 2017. Secondly, the 2007
promise for universal suffrage was already weakened as a result of the pro-Beijing pandering that
occurred during the law’s drafting process. The Hong Kong government’s pan-democratic party
originally pushed for universal suffrage to be achieved by 2012. However, the pro-Beijing camp
pushed for a starting year of 2017 instead. The NPCSC ultimately decided that universal suffrage
elections would occur in 2017, pandering to the Chinese Central Government (Hong Kong
Special Administrative Region). Additionally, during the ruling, the NPCSC highlighted that
“appropriate amendments (...) may be made to the specific method for selecting the fourth Chief
Executive” (Hong Kong Special Administrative Region). Thus, even while the NPCSC decided
that universal suffrage would be utilized in 2017, they made it so the law could be subject to
changes. The implication that amendments could be made to Hong Kong’s planned universal
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suffrage, while not limiting the type of amendments that could be executed, fundamentally
undermines the democratic values of the voting system itself. As a result, when 2014 finally
came around and Hong Kong began preparing for its election season, the NPCSC was able to act
within its legal limits when requiring that chief executive candidates be nominated by a
committee. Because the government felt they were not responsible for succumbing to protesters’
demands, and felt protected by the policies put in place by the Basic Law, they were able to
inhibit universal suffrage and increase democratic backsliding. Therefore, no matter how much
protesters occupied streets and partook in city-wide marches, there was no incentive for the
government to change their courses of action. Instead, all the Hong Kong government had to do
was sit idly by and wait for the movement to subside.
Unlike the 2014 Umbrella Movement, the initial triggers of the 2019 AntiELAB
Movement were perceived as much more of a threat, and thus contributed to the protests'
prolonged and aggressive nature. The AntiELAB Protests were triggered by what Hong Kong
citizens viewed as the government taking away their pre-existing fundamental democratic rights.
The Extradition Bill, which could force suspected Hong Kong citizens to be tried under Beijing’s
legal systems, blurs the lines between Hong Kong and Beijing’s rules of law. Many Hong Kong
citizens saw this as an imminent threat to their sovereign political securities. Since 1997, Hong
Kong’s rule of law has always been regarded as fairly liberal and democratic, especially in
comparison to that of mainland China. This has been particularly true considering the rise of Xi
Jinping and his tightened authoritarian grip on the Chinese mainland. In the 2019 World Justice
Project Rule of Law Index, Hong Kong ranked sixteenth globally, third in Asia, and even five
places ahead of the United States (J. Wong). The city’s supposedly strong legal system which
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protects each citizen's freedom of action and speech is what gave Hong Kong people a peace of
mind after the handover. As a result, when this rule of law was threatened by an Extradition Bill,
it sparked a violent and emotional response. Hong Kong citizens saw the Extradition Bill as
robbing the city of their guaranteed political freedoms. The Hong Kong government’s seeming
neglect for the city’s rule of law was further exacerbated by the way the authorities responded to
demonstrators early in the protests. Many activists have pointed to police brutality, the
authority’s dangerous use of weaponry, and lack of accountability as similarities to the Chinese
Communist Party’s methods of state control (J. Wong). Thus, the government’s sudden removal
of Hong Kong citizens’ basic protections through the Extradition Law and Bill, compounded
with their execution of brute force to control the protesters was seen as an imminent threat to the
special administrative region. As a result of the government’s manipulation of the Basic law
which eroded citizens’ protections, the 2019 AntiELAB Protests degenerated into a chaotic mess
that quickly spiraled out of control.
The Extradition Bill’s undermining of Hong Kong citizens’ identity as a separate state
from the mainland was another trigger that caused the 2019 AntiELAB Movement to generate
more fury and anger than the 2014 Umbrella Movement. The lack of government accountability
in protecting Hong Kong citizens’ democratic values was a driving factor that increased anxieties
in the city, forcing the protests to devolve into an anti-establishment movement. Paul Shieh,
former chairman of the Hong Kong Bar Association highlights this escalating fear by explaining
that “it is difficult for Hong Kong citizens to visualize a state in which the rule of law exists in
the absence of genuine democracy” (J. Wong). The Extradition Law not only pushes against the
democratic identity of Hong Kong citizens that sets it apart from the autocratic mainland, but
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also infringes upon the “one country, two systems” rule that China is required to abide by. The
Western conception of freedom and democracy has been ingrained in Hong Kong society for
more than a century under British colonial rule, and is a core component of Hong Kong’s
identity. However, the political freedoms enjoyed by the people of Hong Kong is fragile, and can
only be sustained if the government is both subject to the city’s laws, and held accountable by
the citizens. As a result, the Extradition Bill has shown the Hong Kong people that their
government can no longer be bound by their own regulations or citizens, igniting a much brighter
flame to fuel the AntiELAB Movement. Hong Kong people’s determination to physically fight
for their democracy and freedom is thus seen by protesters as the only way to protect the unique
identity of what it means to be a Hong Konger.

Political Circumstances
While 2014 and 2019 were only five years apart, it is important to recognize the
differences in Hong Kong’s political climate to consolidate how these contexts affected the
divergent development of the protests. China’s influence on Hong Kong and international
politics has contributed to the volatile political climate that set the background to both protests.
However, participants in the 2014 Umbrella Movement felt that they had a stronger sense of
political security compared to 2019. The political circumstances leading up to 2014 allowed
organizers to feel they could garner more public support and government acceptance, whereas in
2019 activists had lost hope in the governments’ willingness to acknowledge their demands. This
in turn contributed to the AntiELAB protesters’ violent and aggressive behaviour compared to
the relatively peaceful demonstrators of the Umbrella Movement.
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Firstly, one of the reasons the 2014 Umbrella Movement was not as aggressive as the
2019 AntiELAB Movement was because it was one of the first instances in which Hong Kong
citizens had experienced a genuinely contentious political ruling. Between 1997 and 2014, it is
difficult to identify activities or actions taken by Beijing that directly infringed on the political
freedoms of Hong Kong citizens. Prior to 2014, only a few pieces of legislation had caused
dissatisfaction in Hong Kong. Similar to the trigger of the Umbrella Movement, these
contentions involved the government’s attempts to limit universal suffrage. For example, the
2005 ‘Protest for Democracy’ and the 2010 ‘Marches for Universal Suffrage’ were reactions
against the governments’ decision to uphold Hong Kong’s electoral college rather than allow for
citizens to directly vote for their leadership (Gunia). Because both these protests eventually
pressured the government to publicly, yet vaguely, state their intention to install universal
suffrage at some point in the future, the protesters assumed that this was the government
agreeing to their demands, and thus deemed the demonstrations as a success. Protesters felt that
their pleas had been understood by the Hong Kong administration, and thus didn’t engage in any
radical actions. Additionally, the Hong Kong government’s track record prior to 2014 in dealing
with crises were seen as generally applaudable. The Hong Kong government was widely praised
for its careful management of the multiple pandemics, such as SARS and the Avian Influenza,
that hit the region (A. Wong 101). They were also commended for their cautiousness in
alleviating the Asian Financial crisis’ impact on the city (Bloomberg). The Hong Kong
government’s competence in managing national emergencies thus further enhanced the
perception that Hong Kong was in capable hands, and had a stable political environment. The
2014 Umbrella Movement was a fundamental shift from this previous political understanding.
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Unlike earlier demonstrations that pushed for democratic voting in the near future, the Umbrella
Movement was different as it protested the Hong Kong government’s rollback on their promise
of universal suffrage. Rather than pushing for democratic reform, the 2014 protesters were
fighting against the infringement of already-existing egalitarian practises. As a result, while
previous movements only drew a couple thousand street protesters, the 2014 Movement proved
to be an anomaly rallying over 100,000 participants at its peak. The fact that the government had
gone back on its promise was seen as a rare egregious action that could be circumvented by
peaceful demonstrations. Therefore, political circumstances leading up to 2014 protests
encouraged the assumption that the government would concede to civil disobedience. The 2014
Umbrella Movement’s relatively peaceful progression can thus be partially attributed to Hong
Kong citizens’ perception of the city’s generally stable political environment.
The relatively amicable relationship between China and the West was another key reason
that the 2014 Umbrella Movement was much less violent than the 2019 AntiELAB Movement.
In 2014, China’s correspondence with the United States was not hostile, but cautiously
collaborative. This meant that during the 2014 protests, activists on the ground had less
encouragement or overt support from Western press, governments, and ideologies that could
have propelled their rage into further action. This contrasts the 2019 protests in which China and
the United States have become strongly antagonistic. The US-China trade war started by
President Donald Trump in 2018 exacerbated the political and ideological differences between
Beijing and Washington. Additionally, the anti-China economic and ideological sentiments in
the West encouraged the 2019 AntiELAB Protests to be fueled by Western anti-Chinese values.
Activists in 2019 were often captured waving American flags, engaging with Western reporters,
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and spouting the same anti-Chinese rhetoric Trump has been widely criticized for (Bradsher).
Unlike in 2019, protesters in 2014 rarely used political symbols or populist rhetoric from the
West. This is because even though China and the United States were not allies at the time, the
collaboration between the two nations was enough to avert an ideological war between them.
Therefore, while some Western politicians did encourage Hong Kong citizens in their fight for
universal suffrage in 2014 it did not promote the same populist-fuelled anti-Chinese rhetoric as it
did in 2019. The 2014 Umbrella Movement protesters acted in a much more conservative
manner as a result of moderate international political factors. Without the encouragement from
the US-Chinese political and trade war to push activists to engage in radical actions, the protests
ended up slowly subsiding and eventually fizzled out.
Another reason the 2014 Umbrella Movement was more effectively managed than the
2019 AntiELAB Movement, was because of the difference in Hong Kong’s leadership. Hong
Kong’s Chief Executive CY Leung responded with political dexterity to the Umbrella Movement
compared to Carrie Lam’s incompetent reaction in the initial rounds of the AntiELAB Protests.
CY Leung’s close relationship with Beijing informed his political judgement and reactions to the
protests. This ultimately helped him enforce the conservative trajectory of the 2014 Umbrella
Movement. Unlike Carrie Lam, CY Leung was quite favoured by the Chinese Communist Party.
Leung proved loyal by siding with Beijing in several contentious cases such as reinforcing
Beijing’s rhetoric regarding the Tiananmen massacre, supporting projects to build more
infrastructure linking Hong Kong with the mainland, as well as condemning the jailed Chinese
dissident Liu Xiabo (Pomfret). As a result, when protests began escalating in 2014, CY Leung
was confident that Beijing trusted him enough to responsibly deal with the Umbrella Movement.

44

Leung did not feel the need to prove his competence to the mainland by enacting fringe and risky
policies (Chan). For example, only fairly late in the protests did Leung deploy a police force to
quell protests. Even when he did so, he did not order violent action against the protesters, nor did
he frame the protests as riots. CY Leung’s level headed tactics allowed him to focus on quitely
ushering protesters away, and waiting for the worst to blow over. By slowly and calmly picking
off remaining stragglers when the Umbrella Movement began to subside, CY Leung was able to
effectively extinguish the Umbrella Movement within three months. This contrasts Carrie Lam,
who was a new figure in Hong Kong’s political scene with shallow ties to Beijing. One of Lam’s
greatest shortcomings was that she felt she was not trusted by Beijing (“Lack of Legitimacy Will
Hem in Hong Kong's New Leader”). As a result, Lam acted to please Beijing at the early stages
of the protests, framing the initial peaceful marches as riots, calling on fully equipped riot police
to subdue activists, and stubbornly continuing to push for the Extradition Bill. As protesters
retaliated and the situation escalated, Lam grew more and more insecure about her position in
Hong Kong, fearing Beijing’s faltering faith in her. As a result, Lam felt she could not withdraw
the Extradition Bill, possibly worrying it would expose her vulnerability to the Central Chinese
Government. Because Lam continued to announce her stance to uphold the Extradition Bill, the
angry protesters continued to rampage throughout Hong Kong. Carrie Lam’s rash actions thus
propelled Hong Kong citizens to engage in more violent and extreme acts as time progressed. By
the time Lam finally withdrew the bill, it was too late. Protesters had already lost faith in the
government and were incentivized to continue their acts of defiance and disruption. Therefore,
Hong Kong’s leadership capabilities were core contributing factors to the nature of the protests.
Because CY Leung was more secure in his position in Beijing’s eyes compared to Carrie Lam’s
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vulnerable disposition, Leung was able to carry out rational and level headed responses that
quelled the 2014 Umbrella Movement with relative speed and order.
The rapid change in Hong Kong’s political atmosphere between 2014 and 2019 was
another contributing factor to the AntiELAB Movement’s disorderly nature compared to the
Umbrella Movement. 2019’s political circumstances were much more volatile than that of 2014,
marked by gradual erosions of political safety and freedoms, as demonstrated by several
alarming events. As a reaction to the 2014 protests, Beijing increased its efforts to rein in
political dissent in Hong Kong. One way the Chinese government did this was by kidnapping
book publishers who were generating content that criticized members of the Chinese Communist
Party. This kidnapping aggravated worries about freedom of speech and expression in Hong
Kong. Between October and December 2015, five staff members of a Hong Kong book
publishing house “Causeway Bay Books” were reported missing. The publishing firm had been
known for producing books critical of Chinese government officials. However, such criticisms
did not violate any Hong Kong laws and did not legally call for state-sanctioned punishments.
While never officially revealed, it is widely suspected that the book publishers had been detained
by Chinese authorities as a ploy by Beijing to control the narrative surrounding Xi Jinping’s
administration within Hong Kong (Jenkins). There is proof that at least two of the book
publishers disappeared while travelling within mainland China. Another publisher disappeared in
Hong Kong only to later reappear in the mainland without having the necessary travel documents
necessary to have crossed the border through legal channels. Yet another publisher disappeared
whilst on vacation in Thailand, again only to end up in the mainland (Jenkins). The
unprecedented disappearance of people in Hong Kong came as a shock to most citizens, as the
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city’s rule of law had never permitted the Chinese Central Government to interfere so directly
with Hong Kong residents’ personal lives. The disappearances were an alarming infringement of
several articles of the Basic Law regarding the principles of one country, two systems (Kellogg
1239) and fundamentally threatened Hong Kong’s protection of its people from China’s reach.
The situation was further aggravated when Gui Minhai, one of the missing book publishers,
made his first public reappearance through a confessional video. In the video broadcasted on
Chinese national television, Gui insisted that his return to the mainland was voluntary. However,
this was widely believed to be a forced statement due to Gui’s disoriented speech pattern and
failure to address his movements over national borders (Kellogg 1242). The Chinese Communist
Party’s manipulation of Hong Kong citizens’ personal lives, undermining their freedoms of
speech, and most importantly their personal safeties under the special administrative region’s
Basic Law thus alarmed the people of Hong Kong. Therefore the outlandish kidnapping of Hong
Kong citizens by the Chinese government just after the 2014 Umbrella Movement promoted
anxieties in Hong Kong regarding their political freedoms and safety leading up to 2019.
Increasing Chinese sharp power in Hong Kong is another key contributor to the increased
anxieties experienced by Hong Kong citizens between 2014 and 2019. As highlighted by the
National Endowment for Democracy in 2017, sharp power stems from national ideologies that
promote state power over individual liberty. Sharp power policies are fundamentally hostile in
practice. They involve intimidation, coercion, censorship, and manipulation in order to diminish
the validity of the victim nation’s institutions (Walker). As a reaction to the 2014 protests,
Beijing used sharp power in attempts to expand its influence in Hong Kong, exercise stronger
control in the region, and erode certain liberties in the region. Two examples of Chinese sharp
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power in Hong Kong enacted between 2014 and 2019 include the barring of people’s ability to
insult the Chinese national anthem when played in the city, as well as the establishment of
compulsory national education classes in Hong Kong public schools. The barring of criticisms of
the Chinese national anthem through the National Anthem Bill on January 11th, 2019, was
intended to preserve the dignity of the anthem and Chinese culture. However, most citizens
believed the bill was enacted by Beijing in attempts to quell Hong Kong-mainland tension
resulting from the 2014 Umbrella Movement. Following the 2014 protests, many Hong Kong
citizens began to boo the national anthem when it was played at large gatherings, such as sports
games. The Hong Kong national football team even booed the anthem during international
football matches. While FIFA issued warnings to the Hong Kong Football Association, players
continued to disrespect the anthem (Porteous). As a result, the Chinese Central Government
extended the mainland’s national anthem law to Hong Kong. Beijing argued that this new law
would help foster “social values and patriotism in Hong Kong”. Under the law, violators,
including those who modified the anthem’s lyrics, mock the song, or play it during
“inappropriate” occasions could be detained up to 15 days under criminal prosecution. The
NPCSC ultimately added the National Anthem Law to the Annex Section of the Basic Law of
Hong Kong, which meant it became an official piece of local legislation (Pang). The
implementation of the National Anthem Law to Hong Kong’s Basic Law demonstrates China’s
problematic use of sharp power in the region. Beijing’s enforcement of the mainland’s
nationalistic laws without Hong Kong citizens’ consent, exacerbates the aggressive and
subversive policies that are often weaponized by authoritarian governments to project their state
power in democratic regions. Chinese sharp power thus encouraged anxieties over encroaching

48

Chinese control in Hong Kong, ultimately incentivizing Hong Kong citizens to want to fight
harder and longer during the 2019 AntiELAB Protests.
Similarly, the Chinese government’s persistent attempts to establish compulsory national
education classes in the special administrative region proved alarming to many Hong Kong
residents. Many concerned citizens saw Beijing’s action as an encroachment of the mainland
Chinese education system upon Hong Kong’s independent schooling practices. In 2012, the
Hong Kong administration was forced to shelve plans for a national education curriculum in
local schools after massive public backlash. However, in 2017, the contentious issue was brought
back to LegCo by Chief Executive Carrie Lam, who made the topic a top priority during her first
month in office despite dissenting public opinions. Lam’s administration had been outspoken
about reforming education to “instil patriotism in students” (Pang). Lam’s rhetoric has stoked
fears among parents, educators, and students alike who worry that propagandistic education
could permeate into Hong Kong schools. The biggest issue is the contents of the national
education. Lam’s administration promoted the idea for children, starting from kindergarten, to
identify with the statement “I am Chinese”. Lam argued that it would give students a stronger
sense of Chinese national identity. However, this proved problematic as the issue exacerbated
political tensions over the “one country, two systems” formula under which Hong Kong should
be governed (P. Chiu). Under “one country, two systems'', Hong Kong is supposed to be free to
maintain its own identity, legal systems, and culture. Beijing’s enforcement of a national
education with heavy Chinese rhetoric would fundamentally shift Hong Kong’s politics and
society, thus infringing on the special administrative region status. As a result of Beijing’s push
for national education as a part of their coercive sharp power, Hong Kong citizens had begun
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developing increasing negative sentiments towards the mainland. Therefore, high profile
incidents such as kidnapping of book publishers, the national anthem law, and a city-wide push
for educational reform has raised suspicions about Beijing’s political intentions. This in turn has
fuelled concerns about how much the Chinese Communist Party is willing to honor Hong Kong’s
way of life.
As a result of growing Chinese sharp power and increased political control in Hong Kong
society, feelings of anxiety regarding demoratic backsliding and a loss of agency slowly built up
in the special administrative region. This ultimately contributed to growing anger and fears to
permeate the city, ultimately leading to the explosion that was the 2019 AntiELAB Movement.

Socioeconomic Environments
The deterioration of Hong Kong’s socioeconomic environment in the last decade has
been a main source of dissatisfaction amongst the city’s population. The lack of change in
inequality, increases in housing prices, and negative impacts on unemployment rates between the
years 2014 and 2019 exposed the government’s incompetence in addressing pressing issues in
Hong Kong society. The frustrations of the working class who saw no improvement in their
social and economic circumstances generated feelings of resentment that fueled the
anti-government protests. This in turn contributed to the turbulent attitudes and actions displayed
by demonstrators in the 2019 AntiELAB Protests compared to the 2014 Umbrella Movement.
One of the most prominent socioeconomic issues Hong Kong citizens encountered in
2014 was the inflated housing prices and declining ownership of private property. Happiness
amongst Hong Kong youth has rapidly declined since the city’s handover in 1997 as a result of
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the inability for young citizens to find independence and be residentially mobile. According to a
research project by Stephen Wing-kai Chiu and Kevin Tze-wai Wong, rapid economic growth
and the rise in housing prices is positively correlated with the level of dissatisfaction towards
Hong Kong’s political climate. In their research, Chiu and Wong found that on average, people
aged 18-30 years old had experienced a decrease in their happiness from 2.9 to 2.79 on a scale
from 0 to 4 between the years 2000 and 2014. Hong Kong’s slow economic recovery in the late
2000s meant that many young people who had just graduated from university faced low levels of
employment as a result of a stagnant market. Because of the shifting business landscapes after
the crisis, many recent graduates’ degrees were also less competitive than anticipated, leaving
many students either unemployed or with low paying jobs (261). As a result of Hong Kong’s
soaring housing prices and shortage in housing supply, more and more youth are also forced to
continue living in cramped quarters with their extended family members. Low earning jobs and
rising unemployment have been shown to be negatively correlated with political satisfaction and
government approval in Hong Kong (266). As a result of their rising frustrations with social
immobility, Hong Kong people began to blame their government for the shrinking housing
availability and employment opportunities. The correlation between happiness and dissenting
political attitudes is an instrumental contributor to Hong Kong’s protest culture. Unhappy youth,
as a result of their socioeconomic insecurity, are more inclined to engage in boycotts, protests,
and strikes (Lorenzini 399). Thus, it is understandable that due to the majority of Hong Kong
youth’s dissatisfaction with growing socioeconomic immobility, exacerbated by a rise in housing
prices and unemployment, many frustrated youths took their anger to the streets during the
anti-government protests. The demands for government accountability to support disenfranchised
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populations thus contributed to the anger and violence that fuelled not only the 2014 Umbrella
Movement, but also the 2019 AntiELAB Protests.
While the socioeconomic environment in Hong Kong did not drastically worsen between
2014 and 2019, its slow but persistent deterioration nevertheless aggravated feelings of
insecurity amongst citizens. These vulnerabilities were especially prominent as a result of the
government’s inability to resolve persisting issues given the five-year gap between the two
protests. This fuelled increasing anger towards Hong Kong’s leadership that exacerbated the
violent and desperate nature of the 2019 AntiELAB Movement. Between 2014 and 2019, the
already exorbitant housing prices in Hong Kong rose from 120 to 180 on the housing price
index, meaning that real estate value had risen over 50% within a five-year period (See Appendix
A) (“Hong Kong House Price Index, 1994-2020 Data” Trading Economics). In 2018, the average
price for residential property in Hong Kong was the highest in the world, at over US$2091 per
square foot. This was almost double the price of the second most expensive country, Singapore,
which had an average housing value of US$1063 per square foot (Rudden). Furthermore, salary
data shows that even for college students with prestigious degrees, monthly paychecks could not
compete with the rate in which housing prices continued to soar. The sustained increase in real
estate value compared to slow growth of real wages in the five years leading up to the AntiELAB
Protests magnified the deep dissatisfaction over the government’s inability to meet its people’s
needs. For many Hong Kong citizens, buying a residential flat is becoming increasingly out of
reach. (S. Lee). The average Hong Kong citizen who faced little hope of starting a family or
achieving economic stability, were thus motivated to grab a helmet and black T-shirt and take to
the streets to fight for a democratic cause that could hopefully push for a better socioeconomic
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future. While these disenfranchised citizens partook in the demonstrations due to their anger
about the Extradition Law, the deteriorating socioeconomic circumstances meant that they
already had little to lose. As a result, the intense emotions and violence on the streets in 2019 can
be partially attributed to dissatisfaction over housing shortage and wage stagnation in Hong
Kong.
Rising levels of inequality in Hong Kong is most likely another factor driving the protests
in 2019. Although Hong Kong enjoyed almost full employment levels and high GDP per capita
in early 2019, wealth distribution is a persistent issue that continues to threaten the livelihoods of
many households in the city. A powerful yet often ignored factor underlying the frustrations of
Hong Kong people is this socioeconomic disparity. Hong Kong’s Gini coefficient stood at 53.9
in 2019, the highest it has ever been in the 45 years since the city’s handover. Considering other
developed economies have Gini coefficients averaging 38.8, Hong Kong’s score shows the city
clearly lags behind in its ability to alleviate economic imbalances (Hung). Hong Kong’s level of
inequality has forced around 1.4 million people or 600,000 households to live below the poverty
line (Shek). Many of these people have grown resentful of Hong Kong’s socioeconomic
environment which seems to prioritize wealthy mainland Chinese families and firms. As a result,
many of the poorest in Hong Kong were inspired to take part in the 2019 AntiELAB Movement
in order to fight against Chinese monopolistic encroachment. Assuming that even 5 percent of
these disenfranchised citizens took to the streets, this already contributed to 70,000 angry
activists fighting in the name of the AntiELAB Movement. With the protests against the
Extradition Bill, disenfranchised younger generations were given an opportunity to air out their
anger and hopelessness in a public setting. Therefore, with growing inequality and the lack of a
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clear solution to their socioeconomic circumstances, many disenfranchised young activists used
the 2019 AntiELAB Protests to push for ‘mutual destruction’, enacting increasingly radical
actions in hopes to rebel against the government and system that failed to save them.
Finally, unlike the 2014 Umbrella Movement, the 2019 AntiELAB Protests had
devastating economic impacts on local businesses and unemployment. This exacerbated
frustrations that propelled the protests even further. One of the major reasons the 2014 Umbrella
Movement wasn’t able to gain as much traction as the 2019 Movement was because it didn’t
significantly affect Hong Kong’s economy or unemployment rate. The core of Hong Kong’s
economy relies on its import and export sector, which in 2014 made up around 35 percent of the
Special Administrative Region’s GDP (Headley). During the 2014 Umbrella Movement, total
trade flows in the region was up five percent compared to 2013. Additionally, unemployment
rates held relatively constant at 3.3 percent even during the protests. Under the Umbrella
Movement, which had the potential to lower Hong Kong’s GDP by 30 percent, the Hang Seng
Index value only fell by 6 percent. Even more surprisingly, considering the protests were mainly
centered in large shopping districts, retail sales actually rose throughout 2014. Despite the
protests, hotels in the city were able to maintain around ninety percent occupancy, and
businesses were able to remain open (Headley). The lack of disruption to Hong Kong’s
economy, employment, and business sectors ultimately meant that the government did not feel
pressured to change its policies during the Umbrella Movement. As long as Hong Kong’s
economy remained stable, Beijing had little incentive to grant full universal suffrage to Hong
Kong citizens.
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On the other hand, the 2019 AntiELAB Protests caused major disruptions to Hong
Kong’s economy and employment levels. With regards to long-term employment rates, Hong
Kong had experienced a steady decline in unemployment until 2019. In the period between 2018
and early 2019, the unemployment rate had even dropped to the lowest that it had been in the
city’s last five years, falling to 2.8 percent. However, when the 2019 AntiELAB Protests hit, the
unemployment rate took a turn for the worse, and by late December, unemployment had peaked
at 3.5 percent (See Appendix B) (“Hong Kong Unemployment Rate 1981-2020 Data” Trading
Economics). Hong Kong’s typically resilient labor market began to show signs of strain as the
city’s hotels, restaurants, and shopping malls were hit by a sharp slowdown due to reduced
spending and tourism. As people began to lose their jobs, more citizens became available to take
to the streets. The lack of an occupation holding activists back further contributed to protest
participation and the continued city-wide vandalism in the name of the AntiELAB Movement
(Lam). Unlike 2014 when the GDP was barely affected and the unemployment rate remained
low, the 2019 protests brought larger threats to Hong Kong’s long-term economic health. As a
result of the protests’ economic impact, the panicked Hong Kong government felt they had to
engage in increasingly drastic actions to try and quell the demonstrations. On October 4th 2019,
Carrie Lam invoked the colonial-era Emergency Regulations Ordinance to implement the
Prohibition on Face Covering Regulation, or the Anti-Mask Law, in hopes to hold protesters
accountable to violent actions (K. Cheng). The Anti-Mask Law generated outrage as it was seen
as a further infringement on Hong Kong citizens’ freedom of public action. The new law was
widely ignored, with protesters continuing to wear masks in the name of defiance and public
disruption. Furthermore, Hong Kong’s rising unemployment also aggravated many
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non-protesting groups to retaliate against AntiELAB activists. The spike in unemployment also
affected civilians who were not engaged in the protests. Many pro-Beijing and anti-protest
groups grew increasingly frustrated with Hong Kong’s slowing economy as a result of the
city-wide demonstrations, prompting them to add fuel to the fire by antagonizing pro-democracy
activists on the streets. As a result, both sides of the movement continued to clash and disagree
with each other. This polarized Hong Kong’s protests environment, which further aggravated and
prolonged the chaotic nature of the 2019 AntiELAB Movement.
Hong Kong’s worsening socioeconomic situation proved that the city’s government was
incapable of confronting inflating housing prices or escalating unemployment. Despite protesters
in the Umbrella Movement calling for fundamental socioeconomic changes, the government
ignored citizens’ pleas due to the lack of an economic threat that the 2014 protests posed. As a
result of the government’s inability to address crucial socioeconomic issues, many citizens grew
increasingly angry at Hong Kong’s status quo. Therefore, the worsening social and economic
environment experienced by disenfranchised groups in Hong Kong ultimately contributed to the
desperate and frenzied nature of the 2019 AntiELAB Protests.

Changes in Protest Strategy
In addition to political and socioeconomic factors, the tactics and innovative strategies of
the protesters themselves contributed to the lengthy and violent nature of the 2019 AntiELAB
Movement. In order to better avoid police capture, AntiELAB activists adapted to their
shortcomings in the 2014 Umbrella Movement, ultimately allowing them to engage in extreme
actions while avoiding legal consequences.The disorganized nature of the AntiELAB Movement
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was further exacerbated by the lack of a clear leader that protesters could look up to, as well as
the flexible mentality activists developed whilst dealing with the authorities. These unique tactics
allowed the AntiELAB Movement to sustain its trajectory much more effectively than the
Umbrella Movement.
The 2014 Umbrella Movement was widely praised for its well-organized execution as a
result of the guidance from its respected leaders. The Umbrella Movement’s leadership helped
direct the protest groups, allowing activists to effectively follow certain rules while engaging in
street protests. These rules included the leaders’ calls for acts of non-violence, as well as pleas to
engage in protests only at specific locations and times. The main leaders of the Umbrella
Movement were professors, religious figures, and students from the Hong Kong Federation of
Students and Scholars. Dubbed the Occupy Trio, the non-student leadership consisted of
Associate Professor of Law Benny Tai Yiu-ting, Associate Professor of Sociology Chan
Kin-man, and longtime pro-democracy advocate Reverend Chu Yiu-ming (Arranz). Because the
Occupy Trio were esteemed figures in their academic and religious fields, protesters felt they had
emotional security by relying on these figureheads throughout the duration of the movement. As
a result, the followers of the Umbrella Movement openly adhered to the Occupy Trio’s principles
of non-violence, peace, and pragmatism during the 2014 movement. Furthermore, followers of
the Umbrella Movement were eager to maintain certain behaviours as a result of the directions
invoked by key student leaders. Student leaders such as Joshua Wong, Nathan Law, and Lester
Shum generated trust in the majority-student protest movement. The Hong Kong Federation of
Students and Scholars were able to encourage young protesters to maintain their peaceful and
organized approach to the movement (Arranz). Relatable student leaders paved the way for
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student activists to follow the core messaging of the Umbrella Movement, rather than deviate
and lash out on their own accord. The structured and passionate group of both professional and
student leaders in 2014 allowed the Umbrella Movement to be a protest of peace and general
passivity. While there were some instances of physical retaliation against authority figures, most
of the protests were violence-free. Therefore, clear leadership can be understood as a
contributing factor in making the 2014 Umbrella Movement much less disorderly compared to
the 2019 AntiELAB Movement.
In comparison to the Umbrella Movement, the leaderless nature of the AntiELAB
Movement contributed to the radical and divergent actions of the 2019 protesters. The lack of
leadership in the AntiELAB Protests meant there were no specific rules and ideologies to
motivate the actions of the demonstrators. While in the 2014 Umbrella Movement the leaders
promoted explicit non-violence, the 2019 AntiELAB activists were not held to the same level of
accountability. Instead, AntiELAB protesters were more likely to act out rashly, and commit acts
of violence or public disruption in the name of democracy. Without a leader, protesters were also
more likely to split off into a wider number of protesting groups. This meant that a larger
quantity of demonstrations would happen throughout Hong Kong at the same time. This made it
difficult for authorities to monitor what different groups were doing at peak hours, further
contributing to the disruptive nature of the AntiELAB Movement.
Another reason the 2014 Umbrella Movement was so well organized and peaceful was
because participants had much more time and a larger capacity to prepare. While Beijing’s push
for pre-approved election candidates occurred in August, Occupy Central only officially began
on September 26th (“Hong Kong protests: Timeline of the occupation”). This was unlike the
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2019 Extradition Law and Bill, which after being suddenly announced to the Hong Kong public,
immediately triggered citizens to take to the streets. The one-month buffer period between the
2014 voting law’s announcement and the beginning of the Umbrella Movement gave protesters
enough time to plan out logistics for their occupation and tactics for the demonstrations. In the
week leading up to September 26th, Joshua Wong and other student leaders were able to gather
sufficient donations and supplies for the Occupy Central Protests. Activists were also able to set
up hundreds of tents which would end up forming small temporary ‘villages’ all over the city.
Additionally, volunteer communities were able to stock up supplies to provide protesters with
water and other basic necessities at demonstration sites. This preparation time even allowed for
demonstrators to set up study areas complete with desks and Wi-Fi for student activists to do
their homework (“Hong Kong protests: Instant architecture and the Occupy Central 'village'”).
As a result of the sufficient preparation time leading up to the 2014 protests, more than 200
volunteers were able to be mobilized to support the Occupy Central village project and assist
demonstrators during the Umbrella Movement (E. Cheng). Therefore, without the lead time
given to protesters, it would have been difficult for activists to prepare for the Umbrella
Movement’s well-structured, non-violent, and goal-oriented protests. Time is thus an important
factor in evaluating the peaceful nature of the Umbrella Movement compared to the AntiELAB
Protests.
The lessons protesters learned from the 2014 Umbrella Movement played a critical role
in determining the frenzied nature of the 2019 AntiELAB Movement. Since 2014, activists have
analyzed their shortcomings and better equipped themselves to deal with police tactics. Their
learned experience from the Umbrella Movement informed them to adopt flexible maneuvers in
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order to sustain longer and more impactful demonstrations during the AntiELAB Movement.
One of the main takeaways from the 2014 demonstrations was that protesters should no longer
stay in one place in order to effectively demand change. During the Umbrella Movement,
protesters gathered solely around the Central and Admiralty regions of Hong Kong. This enabled
the police to repeatedly and easily disperse the protesters. As activists continued to be halted by
police intervention, many of them became tired of having their momentum disrupted and
ultimately gave up on the demonstrations. Because protesters abided by a static occupation of
Hong Kong’s streets, the Umbrella Movement failed to gain momentum. As time passed, the
government simply waited out the protest by refusing to budge. The movement ultimately ended
when the last central occupier was ushered off by the police. Thus, when the 2019 AntiELAB
Protests began, activists swore to not let their previous failures repeat themselves. As a result, the
protesters took inspiration from a local hero, Bruce Lee, who famously advised: “be water”
(Dapiran). Hong Kong’s young activists chose to abandon their stubborn occupation strategy of
the past in favour of highly agile, water-like protest tactics. AntiELAB gatherings constantly
shifted, often starting off as peaceful marches that quickly morphed into dispersed rallies. These
rallies would flow through the streets of Hong Kong, with demonstrations rapidly shifting
locations throughout the day. The mottos “no central stage” and “be water” guided the activists
by encouraging fluid movement through Hong Kong, often creating new protest sites by the hour
(F. Lee 15). These tactics were made possible due to the increased use of digital technologies
that quickly notified protesters what to do, where to be, and most importantly how to avoid the
police (F. Lee 14). Hundreds of thousands of individuals could thus use these technologies to
quickly disperse and reappear in a different location to further press their demands, cause

60

disruption, and push for anti-Chinese agendas. Protesters even developed their own police- and
protest-tracking app called HKmap.live. The app crowdsourced the location of police and
anti-government protests which helped protesters find demonstrating groups, and allowed them
to avoid police capture (Murdock). Therefore, the ability for protesters to “be formless,
shapeless, like water” allowed them to avoid the authorities and engage in increasingly divergent
actions. As a result of these new protest strategies and mentalities, the 2019 AntiELAB Protests
were more violent and prolonged compared to the 2014 Umbrella Movement.
Unlike the 2014 protests, the 2019 AntiELAB protesters also had excessively eager goals
that were less likely to be satisfied by any actions by the Hong Kong government. The
protester’s initial demand was very specific, pushing the government to withdraw the Extradition
Bill. However, as the protests developed, the activists’ demands grew more and more radical. It
became increasingly difficult for Beijing to meet the protesters' seemingly outlandish requests.
This could be especially said for the fifth demand: allowing Hong Kong to immediately achieve
universal suffrage. With Beijing’s unwillingness to meet protesters’ concessions, violent
demonstrations continued to ravage Hong Kong throughout 2019. This issue of radical demands
was further exacerbated by the actions of the most extreme and violent protesters. These outliers
did not seem to be motivated by the specific five demands issued by the AntiELAB coalition.
Instead, these radicalists seemed to be made up of unsatisfied citizens looking to vent out their
frustrations over the Hong Kong government in general. Even after Carrie Lam officially
withdrew the Extradition Bill, these outliers continued to set fire to public transportation,
barricade the streets with bricks, and attack anyone who sought to oppose them. Therefore,
because the AntiELAB Movement lacked a clear leader, was driven by protesters' overly
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ambitious demands, and was aggravated by activists’ agile protest tactics, the originally
organized anti-government rallies quickly devolved into a chaotic and anarchic campaign that
left a permanent scar in Hong Kong’s historically peaceful political landscape..

Technology, Social, and Mass Media
A fundamental factor that affected the different trajectories between the 2014 Umbrella
Movement and the 2019 AntiELAB Protests was the way in which protesters consumed media
and utilized technology. In 2014, both local and global broadcast media covering the Umbrella
Movement were relatively positive and much less pointed. Additionally, social media was
primarily used by the Umbrella Movement activists to efficiently organize peaceful sit-ins and
marches. However, the 2019 protests saw an increase in the weaponization of social media, mass
media, and technology forms to promote radicalized anti-government sentiments. This
contributed to the overall chaotic and long-lasting nature of the AntiELAB Movement. The
inflammation of polarizing views throughout Hong Kong media ultimately exacerbated the
tumultuous nature of the 2019 AntiELAB Protests.
Access to bipartisan local media coverage in 2014 was a main contributor to the
Umbrella Movement’s gentler emotional ardor compared to the 2019 AntiELAB Movement. The
existence of print and broadcast media forms that sympathized with protesters’ sentiments
ensured that Hong Kong citizens felt their cries for help were being understood. On one hand,
some media outlets still continued to pander to Beijing. TVB, Hong Kong’s largest public
broadcast station, drew multiple complaints for its biased pro-government reporting.
Additionally, after organized gangs descended on Mongkok and physically assaulted
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pro-democracy demonstrators, Beijing-sponsored newspaper the Oriental Daily chose to outline
protesters’ disruption of city-wide traffic instead of the gang violence (Kuo). Activists were
enraged at the Oriental Daily’s failure to highlight any of the abuses enacted by triad members.
While these two examples underscore the negative reporting about the Umbrella Movement
activists, protesters did not feel misrepresented in 2014 due to other news outlets calling
attention to the protester’s points of view. During the Umbrella Movement, two of the main
media outlets that Hong Kong protesters trusted for fair representation were South China
Morning Post (SCMP), Hong Kong’s largest English-language newspaper, as well as Apple
Daily, Hong Kong’s most popular tabloid-style newspaper. These two publications tended to
engage in neutral reporting, often appealing to the majority of Hong Kong’s population. For
example, on the day after the organized mob attacks on protesters in Mongkok in 2014, SCMP
and Apple Daily both highlighted the violence of the triad attacks on protesters (Kuo). The fact
that these two local Hong Kong media outlets were willing to outline the protesters’ views
allowed citizens to embrace their identity as Hong Kongers and have faith in their own media
institutions. With local media support and fair reporting on the Umbrella Movement, many
protesters felt relieved that freedom of press and media democracy still existed in Hong Kong
despite the city’s contentious political environment. Therefore, relatively bipartisan reporting of
the Umbrella Movement generated a less aggravated protest culture in comparison to the
AntiELAB Movement.
In contrast with the 2014 Umbrella Movement, the 2019 AntiELAB Protests saw a
weaponized use of mass media that generated polarized enclaves of hate and misinformation.
This led to an increasingly tense and contentious protest environment in Hong Kong. The main
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reason the 2019 AntiELAB Movement was propelled so intensely by media polarization was due
to the police’s initial use of violence in the early demonstrations. Appalled by Carrie Lam’s call
for police retaliation, citizens recorded footage of police pepper spraying innocent bystanders,
beating up fleeing protesters, and firing rubber bullets at illegal close ranges. Such videos and
images circulated the internet in many pro-democracy groups and advocacy pages. These forms
of media were used to push forward the narrative that the Chinese-backed police force and the
Hong Kong government are unfair and unjust. On the other hand, pro-police groups began to
resent Hong Kong’s increasingly chaotic protest culture. Many of them felt alienated and
targeted relentlessly, having had their lives significantly disrupted as a result of the prolonged
unrest. These pro-police groups also recorded and posted separate footage of protesters attacking
police headquarters, vandalizing property, and setting people on fire (Withnall). Anti-protest
groups thus used these videos to argue that Hong Kong’s protesting population is violent,
uneducated, and simply seeking a disordered society. The clashing narratives of the protests
disseminated into isolated echo-chambers both online and in mainstream media, fuelling bitter
sentiments amongst the conflicting sides of the protests. While the police and freedom-fighters
both believed they were fighting for a better Hong Kong, the inability for both sides to meet in
the middle due to media polarization factored into the intense and violent nature of the 2019
AntiELAB Movement.
Another main reason the 2019 protests have seen such violence amongst dissenting sides
is due to Hong Kong citizens’ increased use of social and communication media in the protests
as a result of not having a leadership figure to guide them. In general, social media acts as a toxic
environment for polarized thought and unorganized protests. Platforms like Facebook—which
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combine the personal and public—have become politically potent. Due to how the algorithms of
these networks work, social media sites encourage engagement in politics that often focus on one
side of the overall picture (Tufeki 23). Social media algorithms feed users with the same type of
information that they have previously engaged in. For example, AntiELAB activists continued to
see and engage with content that painted the police and the government in a negative light. These
activists would never be exposed to other aspects of the movement such as protesters acting out
irrationally, destroying public property, or physically attacking the opposition. The AntiELAB
protesters’ social media feeds were thus only filled with posts from groups that they already
followed, which consists of ideologies that mirror that of the user. The same can be said for
anti-protest or pro-Beijing supporters who only saw content of protesters being violent, without
receiving news on police brutality or government incompetence (Banjo). The echo chambers
generated by social media niches created a potent digital space for thought polarization. These
conflicting sentiments and misinformation that spread between opposing groups only fuelled the
anger on both sides, encouraging increasingly extreme actions from both parties as time
progressed. Therefore, by spreading one-sided information and instilling polarized ideologies,
social media coerced the 2019 AntiELAB Protests to become more chaotic and divisive than the
2014 Umbrella Movement.
In addition to social media, mass news media also played an important role in
exacerbating polarization during the AntiELAB Movement. In the time between 2014 and 2019,
several of Hong Kong’s main media outlets lost much of their control to either the Chinese
government or large Chinese companies. In 2015, SCMP, one of Hong Kong’s previously most
trusted bipartisan media outlets, was bought by the mainland Chinese company Alibaba. This
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proved problematic as Alibaba is one of the world’s most prominent pro-Beijing organizations
(Hernández). As a result, many protesters saw SCMP’s reporting in 2019 as biased propaganda
originating from the Chinese state. The loss of local reporting accountability, and the sense that
local publications were no longer in support of Hong Kong activists’ rhetoric spurred anxieties
over the reliability of free press in Hong Kong. This ultimately encouraged an escalation in
extreme protest tactics to push for free press and unbiased reporting during the 2019 protests.
Additionally, as the protests began to devolve, all media publications in Hong Kong, regardless
of their political alignments, felt obligated to report on certain violent actions enacted by some
protesters. Local media outlets such as Apple Daily, SCMP, and TVB generated reports about
protesters throwing petrol bombs into open streets, setting ablaze public trains, and smashing in
the windows of stores affiliated with mainland Chinese owners (Connors). While these news
coverages were fair and indicative of the protests’ situation, it only exacerbated the
disappointment felt by AntiELAB activists. Many felt that the Hong Kong media had betrayed
them, and that the lack of reporting that supported protesters was a sign of the city’s faltering
free press. As a result, activists became more motivated to retaliate against the government using
increasingly violent methods, as they felt there was no local media support for them anyway.
The West’s obsession over anti-Chinese ideologies and their pro-democracy sentiments
also overshadowed much of their global reporting, leading to a biased westernized depiction of
the Hong Kong protests. Global media capitalism was thus a key contributor to the polarized
political landscape in Hong Kong. Twenty-first century global journalism is currently dominated
by Western news services, which mostly encompass the United States and its network of
influence. Global corporate media firms are thus purveyors of Western ideals and culture, and
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are slow to criticize any actions that threaten the Euro-centric democratic ordeals (McChesney).
In the 2019 Hong Kong protests, many American mass media outlets such CNN, ABC, MSNBC
tended to avoid topics regarding protesters' violent actions in order to paint a positive picture of
Hong Kong’s demonstrations that aligned with the West’s pro-democracy ideology. For
example, issues such as the stoning of a 70 year old man to death as he tried to disassemble the
protesters' barricades were never reported by most Western news in fears of painting the
AntiELAB Movement, and by extension the pro-democracy sentiments that antagonize China, in
a negative light (Creery). As a result, AntiELAB protesting groups continued to consume a
narrow range of Western news sources compounded by their lack of trust for local Hong Kong
reporting. This in turn fuelled their angry and resentful sentiments towards the Hong Kong police
and government. Therefore, polarized attitudes encouraged by biased Western news reporting
further drove activists to engage with extreme actions during the 2019 AntiELAB Protests.
Finally, the types of technology used to mobilize activists inflamed the radical and
chaotic progression of the AntiELAB Movement. In 2019, protesters primarily coordinated their
activities through encrypted messaging apps in order to maintain privacy and security. Apps such
as Bridgefy and Telegram used mobile device’s Bluetooth function to bounce communication off
individuals’ phones, transferring messages between thousands of individuals while avoiding the
internet. Bridgefy saw 60,000 app installations in the final week of August 2019, and an overall
4000 percent increase in its app usage within the first two months of the AntiELAB Movement
(Koetsier). Because the messages were transferred over Bluetooth rather than Wi-Fi, protesters
could communicate with each other without encountering the dangers of their messages being
intercepted by authorities. These online platforms enabled activists to engage in sustained human
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resource mobilization and high volumes of strategic discussions despite the absence of political
leaders. While these technologies helped protesters peacefully organize in the initial stages of the
protests, the technologies began proving more problematic over time. Without a leader, these
apps could be used to radicalize citizens pushing them to pursue violent actions against police
and other opposition members. Radical activists used apps like Bridgefy to directly encourage
other demonstrators to engage in mass disruptions of Hong Kong’s daily life. Many people were
thus easily persuaded to engage in aggressive protest tactics such as burning trains, cutting off
traffic wires, and graffiting major buildings while avoiding the legal restraints. Communication
technology promoted large-scale chaotic gatherings that often spiraled out of control. This
encouraged a divergence from the movement’s initial core of achieving democracy and
demanding the Extradition Bill to be retracted.
As a result of new technology’s ability to mobilize groups of protesters, in addition to
mass media’s political and commercial alignments, the AntiELAB Protests were pushed to a
point of escalation. The increasingly polarized sentiments encouraged by technology and media
from both sides of the AntiELAB Protests ultimately contributed to the tumultuous trajectory of
the 2019 movement compared to that of 2014.
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Conclusion: The Future of Protests and Politics in Hong Kong
Hong Kong’s political environment was forever changed on September 28th 2014. As
police fired tear gas for the first time at hundreds of thousands of Hong Kong citizens, the
Umbrella Movement and Hong Kong’s fight for democracy officially began. Fast forward five
years to 2019. Hong Kong was yet again embroiled in an anti-government movement, this time
even bigger and more defiant. Despite Beijing’s attempts to diminish the city’s anti-government
sentiments, Hong Kong citizens emerged stronger than ever, taking to the streets and wreaking
havoc in the name of democracy and independence. Growing dissatisfaction over Hong Kong’s
lack of political security and democratic backsliding made each mass protest stronger than the
last. The seeds of grassroots pro-democracy political activism had begun to sprout.
The importance of these pro-democracy protests in Hong Kong are undeniable. The 2014
Umbrella Movement motivated many Hong Kong youth to become more engaged with the city’s
politics. The movement also attracted global attention, bringing to light the growing issues of
Chinese encroachment in East Asia. Additionally, the Umbrella Movement uncovered flaws in
Hong Kong’s Basic Law and Joint Declaration. Following the Umbrella Movement, the 2019
AntiELAB Movement continued to send important shockwaves throughout Hong Kong’s
democratic environment as well as the global political system. The AntiELAB Protests brought
into focus Beijing's increased sharp power in Hong Kong despite public push-back against
Chinese control. Furthermore, the protests gave disenfranchised populations in Hong Kong a
platform to air out their frustrations regarding socioeconomic problems that were often
previously overshadowed. The 2019 AntiELAB Movement thus acted as a second awakening for
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Hong Kong citizens, re-instilling a sense of Hong Kong patriotism and democratic values that
fuelled the city’s radical protest culture.
Despite the benefits of Hong Kong protests in fighting for democratic accountability and
political liberalism, the 2019 AntiELAB Movement in particular saw an escalation of violence
and extremism that not only made it difficult for the government to manage the city, but also
alienated many pro-democracy supporters. It proved difficult for a majority of non-protesting
citizens to sympathize with a pro-democracy movement that ultimately devastated Hong Kong’s
peaceful identity, led its economy into a recession, and generated an apocalyptic atmosphere.
Those who admired and supported the core ideas of the movement often recoiled at the extremist
agendas of radical activists aiming to ‘self-destruct’ and take the city down with them. This study
argues that such radical actions did not occur in a vacuum. Instead, this study outlined the five
main factors that caused the 2019 AntiELAB Movement’s extreme protest trajectory compared
to that of 2014 Umbrella Movement: the Extradition Bill’s immediate threat to Hong Kong
citizens’ personal safeties, Beijing’s increasing unwillingness to honor Hong Kong’s political
sanctity, growing socioeconomic disenfranchisement, a rise in violent yet fluid protest strategies,
and media induced polarization. As long as the underlying causes of the 2019 AntiELAB
Movement’s chaotic nature remain unaddressed, this study argues that the return of another
protest movement may not only be inevitable, but will also be even more extreme.
As Hong Kong’s political atmosphere takes hit after hit through anti-government
uprisings, the questions as to what the city’s future holds is unclear yet grim. On October 31st
2019, the Chinese Communist Party’s central committee issued a communique after its plenum
meeting laying out a strategy to integrate Hong Kong fully into its control. In their plenum,
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Beijing stated its intention to “improve the integration of Hong Kong and Macao into the overall
situation of Chinese national development, promoting the advantages of the mainland”. Beijing
announced its plans to reinforce Hong Kong’s legal system as well as strengthen the city’s law
enforcement in order to better manage dissent. Most problematically, the committee made clear
their intentions of “strengthening Chinese national, historical, and cultural education, especially
amongst public officials and young people'' (Xinhua News Agency) in order to enhance Chinese
patriotism in Hong Kong. It is thus becoming increasingly apparent that China has a hardline
plan for Hong Kong to return to its full control, and that Beijing intends on preventing external
forces from interfering in the city’s affairs. Therefore, as the looming date of 2047 comes closer,
and the ‘one country, two systems’ rule begins to disintegrate, China’s unwavering stance sets up
the possibility for more political clashes to occur between Hong Kong and Beijing in the near
future.
In the end, many pro-democracy activists still felt they had no other choice but to take to
the streets and physically fight for their freedoms. While the 2019 AntiELAB Protests may have
seemed destructive, counterproductive, and even futile, the movement exposes the frustrated,
self-sacrificing and genuinely desperate character of Hong Kong citizens. The AntiELAB
Movement was thus a small example of what Hong Kong activists are capable of as a result of
refusing to give up their political freedoms to the Chinese Communist Party.
Despite the citizens' continued activism, Hong Kong’s political future is most likely not
going to change. While Hong Kong people believe that democracy along with liberal markets is
the best political model for the city, the reality is that Beijing does not see Hong Kong’s political
economy in the same way. China’s rapid economic growth, despite their continued authoritarian
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rule and state control, proves to Beijing that the country’s current political system is more than
sufficient to meet the nation’s long-term goals. It will be difficult for Hong Kong citizens to
convince China that the city should maintain its special administrative status with political rights
included. To Beijing, Hong Kong’s protests are simply acts of extremism and violence that will
lead the city to its own self-destruction before it will ever be fully independent.
Instead of pushing back on issues of political independence and long-term democracy,
the Hong Kong government must address the underlying causes that triggered both the 2014 and
2019 protests. Hong Kong’s leadership must ensure that their citizens feel politically protected
by the city’s laws, work to reduce inequality and housing shortages, prevent police brutality, and
exercise fair unbiased media reporting. The guarantee of Hong Kong citizens promised levels of
freedoms and democracy as supposedly enshrined in Hong Kong’s Basic Law will ensure that
citizens feel they are dutifully protected within the special administrative region; at least until
2047. In addition to addressing issues in Hong Kong’s status quo, it is also an imperative that
the Hong Kong government focus on working with Beijing to either execute a plan of transition
back into the mainland, or work around how Hong Kong’s political position will look like after
2047. Beijing and Hong Kong must not repeat their mistakes of the past. They must avoid the
types of ambiguities and stalled decision making that undermined the legitimacy of the city’s
Basic Law and Joint Declaration during the British handover. Governments must put effort into
incorporating Hong Kong citizens' opinions in the transition process, and ensure a transparent
drafting mechanism when executing future laws and bills. This is the only way in which the
chaos of the past can hopefully be avoided in the years to come.
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Despite the larger half of 2019 being marred by furious protests and Hong Kong’s
political atmosphere burning down into chaos, many Hong Kong citizens still remain hopeful of
the slim chance they will be able to extend their peaceful political autonomy. While China would
like Hong Kong’s citizens’ behaviour to replicate Macau in respecting Chinese rule, Hong Kong
citizens see the situation very differently. For many, Hong Kong’s future comes down to whether
or not the next generation can show Beijing that the benefits of the city’s autonomy outweigh its
reunification. A new era in Hong Kong is dawning, but democratic change in the city continues
to be unresolved. With the halfway point “one country, two systems” arriving soon in 2022, it is
important for the Hong Kong government to start listening to their citizens and protecting their
political sanctities. Democracy and freedom in Hong Kong is not static. Instead, it is constantly
changing in the context of its social, political and economic dynamics as it relates to the
mainland. Through a careful understanding of the intricate relationships between the citizens of
Hong Kong, the Hong Kong’s Legislative Council, and the Chinese Communist Party, the city’s
leadership can lead its people to a less tumultuous future. Therefore, this study argues that only
by confronting the city’s political insecurities, promoting a democratic rule of law, safeguarding
citizens’ individual rights, and alleviating socioeconomic inequality, will the government be able
to prevent the next large protest that has the potential to burn Hong Kong to the ground.
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Appendix
Appendix A
Graph of Hong Kong Housing Price Index between 2011 and 2020, showing the price changes of
residential housing as a percentage change from a 2011 start date of HPI 100
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Appendix B
Graph of Hong Kong Unemployment between 2011 and 2020, showing the fluctuation of
unemployment before and after the 2014 and 2019 protests.
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